CLASSIFIED | POLITICS | TERRORISM | OPINION | VIEWS

Dictates from India

by Neville Ladduwahetty Courtesy The Island 06-06-2007

India's National Security Advisor, M.K.Narayanan is reported to have stated in Chennai "We are a big power in the region…We don't want the Sri Lankan Government to go to Pakistan or China for weapons. Whatever may be their requirements, they should come to us"(The Island, June 1, 2007). Whether Mr. Narayanan was attempting to impress Tamil Nadu's Chief Minister with his bombastic remarks or not, since the remarks were made following a meeting of the two, the fact remains that issues relating to security, defense and foreign policy of the 2 countries are inextricably linked. Consequently, Mr. Narayanan's remarks need close review.

It is an established fact that Tamil Nadu plays a pivotal role as a key coalition partner in any political formation in Delhi. Consequently, the parochial interests of Tamil Nadu have become the determining factor in Delhi's policy towards Sri Lanka. The fact that Delhi has been unable to develop a considered policy towards Sri Lanka is admitted by Mr. B.Raman, a retired Additional Secretary to India's Cabinet. He states: "Unfortunately, our approach to the situation in Sri Lanka has been tactical and erratic. It lacks strategic clarity and purpose. We are letting ourselves be buffeted along without leadership and initiative in policy making"(Daily Mirror, June 4, 2007). The reason for the "lack of clarity and purpose" is the political dynamics in Tamil Nadu and its influence on Delhi.

If Delhi has to reckon with the influence of Tamil Nadu in its policy determinations towards Sri Lanka and these policies have a direct bearing on the security and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, relying then on India to furnish Sri Lanka's security requirements as required by Mr. Narayanan is down right foolish. Furthermore, the policy determinations influenced by Tamil Nadu make even the supply of weapons of defensive capability, such as radar, suspect as to whether the shortfall in capability was intentional or not.

By pressuring Sri Lanka to accept 2D radar through Presidential intervention instead of the 3D as required by Sri Lanka, India was consciously or not, helping the LTTE. The presence of such duplicity is inevitable given the influence of Tamil Nadu in the policy formulation of Delhi. Sri Lanka must understand the full scope of this influence, and should not look to India to furnish any security related items because of the conflict of interest between India national interests and the regional interests of Tamil Nadu that clearly play an overriding role in New Delhi.

Non-offensive weapons

India considers radar to be a non-offensive weapon. It is also a known fact that a non-offensive weapon can turn out to be an offensive weapon if it is technically incapable of performing its intended functions. The need for regular maintenance of the radar equipment supplied by India together with the timing of the shut downs for maintenance can give the LTTE opportunities to carry out offensive actions. The LTTE is probably made aware of the weaknesses in the technology; knowledge it could exploit it to its full advantage for offensive action. The net result is that the ineffectiveness of non-offensive weapons can create the backdrop and opportunities for offensive actions. Therefore, it is in the interest of Sri Lanka not to look to India for the supply of both offensive and non-offensive weapons.

Mr. Narayanan also stated that the India fishermen should be allowed to follow where the fish go. If all the nations followed this Advisor's advice, maritime boundaries would be determined by the fish. But a more pertinent question is whether allowing Indian fishermen to enter Sri Lankan waters falls within the category of being non-offensive. Fishing in Sri Lankan waters is not as innocent as Mr. Narayanan makes it out to be, because the LTTE has on numerous occasions used the cover of Indian fishing boats to smuggle weapons for offensive purposes. The cavalier attitude with which Mr. Narayanan dismisses the issue of the security implications of the Indian fishermen displays clearly both his disingenuousness; and the underlying conflict of regional interests and national interests.

Another well known historical instance where "non-offensive weapons" were used offensively was when a conquering nation distributed blankets infected with small-pox to unsuspecting natives as a measure of good will. The "goodwill gesture" turned out to be a very effective weapon to kill thousands of the natives. In the background of Tamil Nadu's influence and the potential of non-offensive weapons to aid offensive actions, Sri Lanka should be extremely circumspect when buying weapons of any kind from India that could affect the security of the country.

Policy towards Sri Lanka

As admitted by Mr. Raman, Delhi is not free to evolve a consistent policy towards Sri Lanka as long as Tamil Nadu is in a commanding position to influence its outcome. The regional dynamics and influences of Tamil Nadu would compel Delhi to compromise as well as be inconsistent. Compromise would result in preventing India from acting in Sri Lanka's best interests. The Indo-Lanka Accord is a classic example where India compelled Sri Lanka to submit against its best judgment and its territorial interests.

The need to merge the Northern and Eastern Provinces under the Accord was a direct result of the influence Tamil Nadu brought to bear on Delhi. Although there is provision in the Accord to hold a referendum within one year to decide whether the merger should continue or not, India went so far as to discourage the implementation of this democratic provision, which speaks for the power of Tamil Nadu's influence in the policies Delhi is compelled to adopt, despite them being unprincipled.

According to Mr. Raman India's policy towards Sri Lanka should be to protect itself alone from attacks from the LTTE, and should not be directed towards helping to neutralize the terrorism capabilities of the LTTE for which proactive operations might be required. Continuing, he adds: "We (India) should help the Sri Lankan Government not only in protecting its citizens from terrorist attacks, but also in neutralizing the capabilities of the LTTE's air and sea capabilities…(but) should not help the Sri Lankan Government in neutralizing the LTTE's ground capabilities"(Ibid). The question for Mr. Raman to ponder on is: If the sea capabilities are to be neutralized, how could the LTTE maintain its supply of arms in order to retain its ground capabilities?

If Mr. Raman is to be the voice for India, it is evident from the foregoing that India wants to dictate to Sri Lanka how to protect its citizens as well as the precise strategies Sri Lanka should adopt to achieve this objective. His statement that the demerger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces was a negative step and that Sri Lanka must be required to adopt a 'federal model', amounts to India dictating to Sri Lanka how to structure the Sri Lankan state. Even if Mr. Raman's views are dismissed as being that of a retired officer offering "free advice", the remarks of Mr. Narayanan, the current National Security Advisor, cannot be overlooked. Therefore, Sri Lanka has to develop strategies taking into account the realpolitik of the thinking in India.

Sri Lanka has to be wary not only of the advice rendered by India but also advice and aid offered by other countries that are stakeholders of Sri Lanka's national question. For instance, any country can undertake to supply military hardware such as artillery. In fulfilling its contractual obligations a country could supply the guns, but delay supplying the needed ordnance, thus pleasing the Sri Lankan Government while at the same time catering to the interests of the LTTE. Such practices are not beyond the scope of countries that have vested interests in Sri Lanka's national question. Even aid for the reconstruction in the Northern and Eastern Provinces can be used as a non-offensive weapon to extend the agendas of interested donors. For Sri Lanka to charter a prudent course in this quagmire it has to develop an ongoing understanding of global trends.

Conclusion

The political landscape emerging in India is such that regional influences are going to play an increasing role in the affairs of that nation. These trends are inimical to Sri Lanka's interests. Therefore, Sri Lanka has to prepare itself for the internal developments within India, and format strategies to withstand possible fallouts that could affect Sri Lanka. The need to do so is imperative, judging from Mr. Raman's remark that if Sri Lanka's President does not follow India's advice he "should be allowed to stew in his own juice".

Mr. Raman and other retired officers in India who contribute regularly to the Sri Lankan press, should realize that "stewing in one's own juice" is far more preferable to stewing in the "juice" of another's creation. This is what independence, sovereignty and self determination are all about. There was a time when the colonial powers told the colonized that the "juice" they offered was far better than the local "juice" that countries such as India and Sri Lanka were hoping to brew through independence; an imposition that persists in different garb even today. Despite such advice both our countries sought the independence and freedom to create our own respective "juices". It now appears that India is attempting to don the mantle of the former colonizers, by telling Sri Lanka what "juice" is best for the island nation.

The political future of Sri Lanka has to be determined by Sri Lanka itself with great prudence, notwithstanding the bigness of India. This is what self-determination of the nation is all about. The remarks of Mr. Narayanan and Mr. Raman are in complete contrast to the views expressed by the Prime Minister of India and the leader of the Congress Party, Sonia Gandhi, that their hope is for India to be a moral force. The Narayanan/Raman views reflect the narrowness of thinking that is bound to influence India's policies towards Sri Lanka. Therefore, Sri Lanka has to be fully aware of the emerging political landscape in India and act with prudence and courage.

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