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“Your enemy is not necessarily
my enemy”
The West tells India
S. Hewage
During the attack on Mumbai by Muslim insurgents, the Indian government
and the official media spoke-persons repeatedly insisted that the insurgents
were looking for Westerners in the two major hotels under attack. Although
there were hundreds of Western and North American tourists in those
two hotels, only a handful of Westerners were either killed or injured,
not to mention that the three days of assault by the Indian special
forces commandos caused much of the mayhem. Of 190 some deaths, it is
believed that 12 were foreigners, while the rest were Indians.
All civilian lives lost in this attack were tragic deaths, which should
not have happened at all. Given the fact that the large number of deaths
was among the local Indian citizens, and that the insurgents were related
to an Islamic guerilla group fighting for the independence of Kashmir,
is it not possible that these foreigners were just in the wrong place
at the wrong time? As such, is it plausible that the attackers were
not specifically targeting any foreign citizens as suggested by the
authorities and the Indian media?
There are number of questions that have not been answered by those who
suggest that the gunmen were specifically looking for Western citizens.
If the gunmen were targeting foreigners, why did they attack the Mumbai
railway station where almost all of the victims were Indians and the
largest number of people died?
Is there any significant difference between this particular attack on
Mumbai and any of the previous attacks carried out by the Muslim or
any other insurgent groups across India?
Is it possible that India is using the death of few Westerners caught
in the crossfire to create a broad military front against Pakistan,
the archrival of India?
These questions need to be addressed in order to bring peace to the
region, in general, and to India, in particular. The first target of
the attackers were the Mumbai police in charge of the anti-terrorism
operation, which was followed by the attack on various other soft targets
such as the Mumbai major railway station, hotels, cafes, theaters and
hospitals. The Mumbai police suffered the heaviest casualties. During
the attack, the rebels targeted the chief of the Mumbai anti-terrorism
unit and several other senior police officials. Altogether, at least
14 police officers were killed during about 12 hours of fighting. This
is the first indication that the gunmen were not specifically targeting
foreigners, but rather the Indian security establishment, which they
had already warned a few weeks earlier about harassing Muslims in India.
Further, after the gunmen attacked and killed the senior police officer,
it was reported that they hijacked a police van and drove it around
the city firing automatic weapons at random targets, suggesting that
they did not target any specific Western interests, either economic
or political. There are many Western economic and political installations
in Mumbai such as banks, brokerage houses, restaurants, and even diplomatic
missions, which the rebels did not attack. All the targets in general
were Indian, except the Jewish center. This is the only non-Indian civilian
center, which the gunmen had specifically targeted, and this choice
can easily be explained according to the general animosity that exists
between Jews and Muslims stemming from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
in the Middle –East.
Is there a difference between this attack and the
previous ones?
Equally important is the similarity between this particular attack and
numerous previous attacks across India. Over the past few years, Indian
cities, railways, police stations, and even the Indian parliament have
been targeted by Islamic militants for numerous attacks. In all these
incidents, the attackers came either directly from the Indian-occupied
Kashmir or from India proper sympathetic to the plight of the people
of Kashmir. Certainly, this is not the first daring attack by an Islamic
militant group in India in recent memory.
A group called the Deccan Mujahideen, or Indian Mujahideen clamed responsibility
for the Mumbai attack, and they had reportedly informed a local news
station in an e-mail that they were linked to an Islamic militant group
fighting Indian troops in Kashmir. This particular Indian Mujahideen
group has claimed responsibility for a number of recent attacks on both
civilian and military targets in India. The group had reportedly carried
out attacks on July 25 and 26, 2008 in Ahmedabad and Bangalore. In these
attacks, more than 30 Indians were killed and 120 people were injured.
Again, a few months later, on September 13, Indian Mujahideen attacked
in New Delhi killing 18 people and wounding more 90 others. This same
group claimed responsibility for the bombing of Jaipur last May that
resulted in 60 deaths, and injured more than 200 people. Numerous attacks
were carried out by this militant group across India during the last
two years. What is important note is, in all these attacks, the Indian
Mujahideen claimed to have links to Kashmiri fighters, the Lashkar-e-Taiba.
The attack on the Indian Parliament by the Jaish-e-Mohammed in 2001
was very similar to the Mumbai attack of 2008, and the attackers were
reportedly connected to Lashkar-e-Taiba, the main militant group fighting
for Kashmir independence.
It is clear that the Mumbai attack—by tactics, targets, and claims—seems
to fit well with the series of previous attacks in India carried out
by Islamic militants, who are directly linked to the Kashmir conflict.
In every attack, they seem to have taken Indian targets, both civilian
and military. There were no specific Western targets in any of these
attacks except in situations where Westerners were caught in the crossfire.
However, in the Mumbai attack, the gunmen clearly targeted the Jewish
center; and that the Jewish center was chosen, undoubtedly, because
of the specific antipathy towards Jews that exist across the Muslim
world. In fact, the Jewish center became an easy target in the midst
of other Indian civilian installations, such as the railway station,
hotels, and restaurants, none of which were protected from an attack
by a militant group operating inside or outside India.
Given the fact that the gunmen chose five-star hotels in the India’s
commercial capital, it is surprising that there were only a few casualties
among Western tourists. It should be noted that although many of the
hostages were Westerners, no hostages were executed by the gunmen. It
is possible that the gunmen may have actually avoided harming Westerners,
and that many of the Western casualties may have occurred during the
final assault by the Indian troops. It was reported that Indian commandos
could not figure out from which direction the attackers were firing
from, and where the attackers were hiding. After three days of siege
at the two major hotels, the pressure from the Indian authorities to
end the crisis may have forced the commandos to finish off the fighting
resulting in many civilian casualties.
What is so unique about this attack is the sophistication of the planning,
and its execution by the rebels. The attackers must have planned it
many months ahead, and might have conducted reconnaissance prior to
the attack. The attackers were all in their twenties clad in jeans and
jackets. They entered India without the slightest knowledge by Indian
navy, coast guard, Mumbai maritime police, or custom units. This suggests
not only monumental failure on the part of the Indian security authorities,
but also a possibility of internal support within India itself. Recent
reports have indicated that at least two local agents in India allegedly
helped the attackers.
All this evidence—the pattern of similarity of the attack, the
large number of deaths among Indian nationals, and the relatively few
casualties among foreigners despite the fact that the epicenter of the
whole incident were two major tourist hotels, and the death of top level
Indian police officials—indicate that the gunmen were not particularly
targeting Westerners as purported by some Indian officials and newsmen.
A lukewarm response from the West
Given this background about the nature of the attacks in Mumbai, is
it not possible to suggest that some Indian bureaucrats with an ulterior
motive of creating a broader military front against Pakistan may have
been behind the reports that the gunmen were specifically targeting
Westerners? It is a fact that these two nuclear powers are archrivals,
and they have fought three major wars since independence in 1947. Kashmir,
the predominantly Muslim Himalayan territory is divided between India
and Pakistan controlled territories. Although both nations have shown
some inclination to demilitarize the respective borders in recent months,
India is keen on gaining the upper hand militarily over beleaguered
Pakistan, which has become sandwiched between Western forces fighting
Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and its own Islamic militancy.
Indian military strategists seem to believe that a militarily weak Pakistan
is preferable for India’s long-term strategic interests in the
south Asian region, where India is generally viewed with suspicion by
all its neighbors. Against this background of India’s geo-political
objectives, the Western powers have taken a more cautious approach to
the claim that the gunmen were looking for Western targets in Mumbai.
Western officials, after some initial outrage, downplayed the suggestion
and asked India to continue its dialogue with Pakistan. It was particularly
important that all Western leaders who spoke to Indian prime minister
Manmohan Singh also spoke with Pakistani leadership to avoid any perceived
tilt toward India. The general position of the West is clearly that
the militancy in both countries must be controlled. Perhaps this should
be regarded as a suggestion to the Indian government that it should
take appropriate action to control Tamil Nadu extremists openly supporting
the LTTE terrorists fighting in neighboring Sri Lanka.
At a time when the United States and its allies are preoccupied with
two major wars against Islamic militants in two countries—Iraq
and Afghanistan—they can ill afford to lose the support of Pakistan—the
most important ally in the fight against Al Qaeda. Although India may
have thought that “my enemy is also your enemy” when it suggested
that the Mumbai attackers were looking for Westerners and that India
and the West should initiate a military thrust against Pakistan, India
may certainly have been disappointed by the lukewarm response it received
from the West. The West seems to have taken the more astute view that
“your enemy is not necessarily my enemy.”
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