17 Responses to “Why Only Sinhalese Defending Sri Lanka Against UNHRC Threats While Tamils and Some Muslims Freeloading?”

1. Lorenzo Says:
   February 5th, 2014 at 3:11 pm

   PARASITES is the correct word.

   Now even Tamara has joined the anti-SL DAYAN J camp.

   Strange thing is Tamils are the BIGGEST BENEFICIARIES of peace. Still they want racism.

2. Lorenzo Says:
   February 5th, 2014 at 5:17 pm

   On war crimes BS everyone should RE-READ this.

   LW has reproduced this today.

   From Sri Lanka, questions about wars
   The Hindu, November 20, 2013

   Copied from that.

   “The numbers

   It is important to understand why so many different numbers exist, what they mean, and what they imply.
   The methodology behind these figures was first proposed by the University Teachers for Human Rights, a Jaffna-based human rights group. In essence, the UTHR proposed deducting the number of civilians who arrived at the government’s refugee camps from those known to be living in the so-called no-fire zone. This gave a number for people who could be presumed to have been killed.

   However, no one knows how many people were actually living in the no-fire zone to start with. The government agent in Mullaithivu district, K. Parthipan, estimated the population to be around 330,000 in February 2009. Mr. Parthipan, though, had no way of conducting a census in the no-fire zone; he relied instead on reports from local headmen. He did not have any tools to distinguish civilians from LTTE conscripts and irregulars. He had no way of accounting for people who fled the zone to safety as the Sri Lankan forces closed in.

   Mr. Parthipan’s numbers weren’t supported by the United Nations Panel of Expert’s analysis of satellite images, which suggested a population of 267,618. The U.N. experts then attempted a rule-of-thumb calculation of 1:2 or 1:3 civilian dead for every person known to be injured, which suggested 15,000 to 22,500 fatalities — much lower than the estimates that have now become commonplace. Finally, the panel plumped for an estimate of 40,000, based on Mr. Parthipan’s numbers.

   Notably, the panel did not distinguish between civilians and the LTTE cadre — a fact noted by the U.S. State Department’s December 2009 report to Congress. The LTTE’s regular forces, estimated by experts at around 30,000, were backed by irregulars, the makkal padai, as well as press-ganged conscripts.

   Deliberate killing?

   It isn’t unequivocally clear, either, that disproportionate or indiscriminate force was used to eliminate these forces. Satellite imaging shows that right up to May 17, the Sri Lankan Army was facing fire from the LTTE’s 130 mm, 140 mm and 152 mm artillery. The Sri Lankan Army claims to have been losing over 40 soldiers a day during the last phases of the war. The former U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Robert Blake, sent a confidential cable to Washington, DC, on January 26, 2009, saying that the Sri Lankan Army “has a generally good track record of taking care to minimise civilian casualties during its advances.”

   Jacques de Maio, head of operations of the International Committee of the Red Cross, concurred: on July 9, 2009 he told a U.S. diplomat that Sri Lanka “actually could have won the military battle faster with higher civilian casualties, yet chose a slower approach which led to a greater number of Sri Lankan military deaths.”

   It is worth noting, too, that the U.N. panel acknowledged that the LTTE put some of those civilians in harm’s way. The report found “patterns of conduct whereby the LTTE deliberately located or used mortar pieces or other light artillery, military vehicles, mortar pits, and trenches in proximity to civilian areas.”

   D.B.S. Jeyaraj has graphically described how the LTTE forced civilians into the Karaichikkudiyiruppu area to defeat an offensive by the Sri Lankan Army’s 55 division and 59 division.

   Photographs taken by a cameraman for The Times of London on May 24, 2009, for example, show what appear to be pits for siting mortar, an arms trailer and a bunker, in the midst of a civilian location in the no-fire zone.

   None of this, of course, settles things one way or the other — and that’s the point. There is very little doubt that the Sri Lankan forces did commit crimes. They worked with savage paramilitaries who were out to settle scores with the LTTE. It doesn’t follow from this, though, that Sri Lanka’s campaign against the LTTE was genocide.”

3. Mr. Bernard Wijeyasingha Says:
   February 5th, 2014 at 6:37 pm

   Times like this the loyalty of the citizenry must be tested. This does not stop with the Tamils or the Muslims but also the Sinhalese sympathizers for they are the worst. A Roman named Marcus Tullius Cicero stated this about the “enemy within”:

   “A nation can survive its fools, and even the ambitious. But it cannot survive treason from within. An enemy at the gates is less formidable, for he is known and carries his banner openly. But the traitor moves amongst those within the gate freely, his sly whispers rustling through all the alleys, heard in the very halls of government itself. For the traitor appears not a traitor; he speaks in accents familiar to his victims, and he wears their face and their arguments, he appeals to the baseness that lies deep in the hearts of all men. He rots the soul of a nation, he works secretly and unknown in the night to undermine the pillars of the city, he infects the body politic so that it can no longer resist. A murderer is less to fear.”

   That is the beast Sri Lanka faces from within. But who are the nations aligned against Sri Lanka? They are by large Christian based nations. The Hindu Tamils are using the very institutes created by the Christian nations against Buddhist Sri Lanka.

   The hypocrisy of the United States whose demand to Colombo to penalize her own military for charges brought on them by pro LITE Tamils flies in the face of blatant hypocrisy. During the Vietnam war the US used chemical weapons banned by the Geneva conference. Chemical toxins such as Agent orange and Napalm were used and to this day no nation has demanded from Washington the massive acts of genocide commited by the US military and Washington has not taken the issue either. The US including France who handed over the war in Vietnam to the US have no moral high ground regarding Sri Lanka. Other examples of human rights violations not addressed include India’s Operation blue star which was done to end a separatist movement called Khalistan.

4. Nalliah Thayabharan Says:
   February 5th, 2014 at 7:35 pm

   Let the people born in Sri lanka who are not patriotic, slink off to other countries. These people with no national pride don’t even love their motherland.
   If ONLY Tamils administer laws on Tamils and that ONLY Tamils can govern themselves then this will lead to “BALKANIzATION” of Sri Lanka.
   In Singapore EIP – Ethnic Integration Policy – is enforced to balance ethnic composition.
   Any Sri lankan should be able to live where ever they want, as long as the law of the country is respected and follwed. When racists use “Tamil Areas” it implies that there are some areas exclusive for Tamils. This “Tamil Exclusiveness” concept is one of the roote causes for ethnic tension in our motherland. Mono ethnic enclaves should not be encouraged. That’s the reason to non-tolerance of other cultures. Everyone should have a common Sri Lankan identity. Sri lanka is for every son and daughter of the soil, whether speaking in English, Tamil or Sinhala. Equality,liberty and freedom to exercise one’s religion, language and culture is all that matters.
   Time has come to stop all this nonsense of being Tamil and Sinhalese. We are all Sri Lankans and Sri Lanka belongs to all its children. Every Sri Lankan citizen has to be treated equally, should be allowed to move around freely without any restrictions and when they do so they should be encouraged to procure these assets at market prices. If the Tamils can live other parts of Sri Lanka, then why Sinhalese don’t have the same right. There are no ethnic homelands in Sri Lanka – only Sri Lankans and Sri Lanka.
   Sri Lanka is a free country; Anybody from Dondra Point should be able to live in Point Pedro and vice versa as well. Co-inhabitant is the best solution to national integrity and makes different ethnic groups to understand each other.

5. Nalliah Thayabharan Says:
   February 5th, 2014 at 7:40 pm

   Though LTTE used Tamil speaking Sri Lankans as human shields, killed them, denied them food and medicines watched without a hum by the Tamil Diaspora and Tamil politicians, it was the Sri Lankan Army that braved LTTE attacks and mines to save 294,000 Tamil speaking Sri Lankans. These brave soldiers are the rightful owners of our motherland including Jaffna peninsula.

6. NAK Says:
   February 6th, 2014 at 3:14 am

   NT, Not even a word of thanks from at least Wiggles, let alone Diaspora and TNA.

7. Nanda Says:
   February 6th, 2014 at 5:10 am

   “These brave soldiers are the rightful owners of our motherland including Jaffna peninsula.”
   Nicely put. They are the real kings and queens.

   But a visitor form the Airport see the King’s photo first, at a position higher than Buddha, followed by huge bannars of the King all over the place. Where are the real kings. You have to go to jaffana to see them ?
   The saved not only Jaffan and the North but the whole of Sri Lanka.

8. Nalliah Thayabharan Says:
   February 6th, 2014 at 6:02 am

   Nanda ! Please read the following:

   courtesy of Reuters

   “The news about the killing of Prabhakaran sparked mass celebrations around the country, and people poured into the streets of Colombo, dancing and singing. Looking back at the war General Fonseka made two insightful observations that must surely resonate in the minds of military strategists dealing with terrorism and insurgency in other parts of the world. The first is on the commitment of the political leadership to eliminate terror. Eelam IV war began as a poll-promise. President Mahinda Rajapaksa rode to power four years ago vowing to annihilate the LTTE. In the early hours of Tuesday the fight for Eelam, a separate homeland for the Tamils in Sri Lanka, begun in 1983 ended in a lagoon, the Nanthi Kadal. Velupillai Prabhakaran’s dead body, eyes wide open, top portion of the head blown off, the thick bushy moustache in place, was found in the lagoon by the Sri Lankan forces looking for remnant LTTE stragglers.
   In the President’s Office in Colombo officials talk about the ‘Rajapaksa Model’ (of fighting terror). “Broadly, win back the LTTE held areas, eliminate the top LTTE leadership and give the Tamils a political solution.” Sunimal Fernando, one of Rajapaksa’s advisors, says that the President demonstrated a basic resolve: “given the political will, the military can crush terrorism.” This is not as simple as it sounds. Like most poll promises he did not have plans to fulfill his promise to militarily defeat the LTTE. Eelam I to III were miserable failures. So the ‘Rajapaksa Model’ evolved, it was not pre-planned.

   FIRST FUNDAMENTAL: POLITICAL WILL
   The first fundamental of this approach was unwavering political will. Rajapaksa clearly conveyed to General Sarath Fonseka: “eliminate the LTTE.” To the outside world he conveyed the same message differently: “either the LTTE surrenders or face, their end.” Rajapaksa instructed the Sri Lankan Army that their job was to fight and win the war. At whatever cost, however bloody it might be. He would take care of political pressures, domestic and international.
   General Fonseka commented: “It is the political leadership with the commitment of the military that led the battle to success. We have the best political leadership to destroy terrorism in this country. It was never there before to this extent. The military achieved these war victories after President Mahinda Rajapaksa came into power. He, who believed that terrorism should and could be eliminated, gave priority do go ahead with our military strategies. And no Defence Secretary was there like the present Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa who had the same commitment and knowledge on how to crush the LTTE. Finally, they gave me the chance of going ahead with the military plan.”

   SECOND FUNDAMENTAL: GO TO HELL
   Following from the first, the second principle of Rajapaksa’s ‘how to fight a war and win it’ is telling the international community to “go to hell.” As the British and French foreign ministers, David Miliband and Bernard Kouchner, found out during their visit. They were cold shouldered for suggesting that Sri Lanka should halt the war and negotiate with the LTTE. As Rajapaksa said during the post-interview chatter “we will finish off the LTTE, we will finish terrorism and not allow it to regroup in this country ever; every ceasefire has been used by the LTTE to consolidate, regroup and re-launch attacks, so no negotiations.” Eliminate and Annihilate – two key operational words that went with the “go to hell” principle of the ‘Rajapaksa Model’. After Colombo declared victory the Sri Lankan Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka used words used by Rajapaksa. That the SLA will not allow the LTTE to “regroup”.

   THIRD FUNDAMENTAL: NO NEGOTIATIONS
   Naturally, the third fundamental was no negotiations with the LTTE. “The firm decision of the political hierarchy not to go for talks with the LTTE terrorists until they lay down arms had contributed significantly to all these war victories,” affirms Fonseka. But this meant withstanding international pressure to halt the war, the humanitarian crisis spawned by the war and the rising civilian casualties. Rajapaksa did all of this by simply ensuring ‘silence’ and information blackout under which the war was conducted. Rajapaksa’s biggest gamble was to give the military a free hand, shut the world out of the war zone.
   When the United Nations, US and European countries raised concerns of high civilian casualties, Rajapaksa, said that the international community was “getting in the way” of Sri Lanka’s victory against terrorism. “We knew that the moment the military is close to operational successes, there will be loud screams for the resumption of the political process of peace negotiations. But there will be no negotiations.” That was the rock solid stand taken and communicated by Sri Lanka’s Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa to all visiting dignitaries and diplomats.

   FOURTH FUNDAMENTAL: REGULATE MEDIA
   With just one version of the war available for the media to report, the Sri Lankan government ensured an unidirectional flow of conflict information. The information put out by the LTTE’s official website, TamilNet, could not be independently verified on the ground because access to the war zone was regulated and controlled. This was a vital fourth principle in the strategic matrix of the Rajapaksa model.
   “Presidents Premadasa and Chandrika Bandaranaike gave orders to the military to take on the LTTE. But when success was near, they reversed the orders and instructed the military to pull back, to withdraw from operations because of international concerns about the humanitarian crisis and civilian casualties. So we had to ensure that we regulated the media. We didn’t want the international community to force peace negotiations on us,” says a senior official in the President’s office who wishes to remain anonymous.

   FIFTH FUNDAMENTAL: NO CEASE-FIRE
   Rajapaksa’s brother, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who consistently maintained that military operations would continue unhindered. “There will be no ceasefire,” was Gotabaya uncompromising message. The clear, unambiguous stand enabled other prominent personalities in the Rajapaksa cabinet to speak in a uniform voice. “Human rights violations during war operations and the humanitarian crisis that engulfs civilians caught in the cross fire have always been the trigger points to order a military pull-back,” asserted Mahinda Samarasinghe, Minister for Human Rights and Disaster Management. “The LTTE would always play this card in the past. They would use the ceasefire to regroup and resume the war.”
   President Rajapaksa was clear that he did not want to go down that route. That was the traditional way of fighting the LTTE – two steps forward, four steps back. The Rajapaksa brothers’ commitment to a military solution was cast in stone. And it was anchored in a deft political arrangement. But first it is important to reveal the idea behind the political arrangement. “It was to ensure that there would be no political intervention to pull away the military from its task of comprehensively and completely eliminating the LTTE,” says a senior official in the President’s Office. “Prabhakaran was aware of the political contradictions in Sri Lanka and so was confident that the SLA will not indulge in an adventurous, all guns blazing, a full onslaught against the LTTE.”

   SIXTH FUNDAMENTAL: COMPLETE OPERATIONAL FREEDOM
   Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s appointment to the post of Defence Secretary was made precisely to break this political logjam. Gotabaya had a military past. He had taken voluntary retirement from the SLA. He had retained his long standing friendship with Lt General Sarath Fonseka. Gotabaya met Fonseka and asked him, “can you go for a win”? The battle-hardened veteran said “yes, but you will have to permit me to pick my own team.” Gotabaya and Mahinda agreed. “We will let the military do its job, while we hold the fort, politically,” they told Fonseka. This deft political arrangement worked because both, Gotabaya and Fonseka, were recruited and commissioned into the army at the same time.
   This is the team Fonseka handpicked by August 2006 – Major General Jagath Dias, commander of the 57 Division, Brigadier Shavendra Silva, commander of Task force One also the 58 Division (the SLA formation that has recorded the maximum victories against the LTTE), Major General Nandana Udawatta, commander of the 59 Division and Major General Kamal Gunarathne and Brigadier Prasanna Silva, commanders of the 53 and 55 Divisions respectively. Their task was to recapture 15,000 square kilometers of area controlled by the LTTE. The defection of LTTE’s Eastern chief, Karuna, helped the Army take over Batticaloa, Tamil Tigers’ eastern stronghold on July 11, 2007.
   By the time of LTTE’s defeat in the East, the 57 Division under the command of Major General Jagath Dias started military operations north of Vavuniya. Eighteen months later, in January 2009, the 57 Division marched into Kilinochchi, the head quarters of the Tamil Tigers. Parallel to this the Task Force One (58 Division) under Brigadier Shavendra Silva achieved stunning success moving from Silavathura area in Mannar in the west coast, capturing Pooneryn and Paranthan. These troops then swiftly recaptured Elephant Pass, linked up with the 57 Division and further moved to Sundarapuram, Pudukudiyiruppu and finally the eastern coast of the country. Meanwhile, the 59th division of the Army, commanded by Major General Nandana Udawatta opened a new front in Welioya area in January 2008 and within a year marched into the LTTE’s administrative hub, Mullaitivu. Finally, troops from 53rd, 55th, 58th and 59th bottled up the LTTE in along a small patch of eastern coastal land in Mullaitivu and killed the top leadership, including Prabhakaran.
   The decision to bring Fonseka out of retirement paid off because he was a hardcore advocate of military operations to crush the LTTE. With rock solid political backing Fonseka was able to motivate his troops and officers to go all out without fearing any adverse consequences. It’s not surprising why Eelam IV turned out to be a bloody and a brutal war. “That there will be civilian casualties was a given and Rajapaksa was ready to take the blame. This gave the Army tremendous confidence. It was the best morale booster the forces could have got,” says a Sri Lankan minister who wishes to let this quote remain unattributed.
   Is it any surprise, therefore, that LTTE wanted to assassinate Gotabaya in 2006? Prabhakaran knew that if he could assassinate Gotabaya then the carefully constructed political-military architecture pushing the war operations forward would have been gravely undermined. Gotabaya escaped the assassination bid and the rest as the cliché goes, is history.

   So even though Gotabaya came into the political set up virtually out of nowhere, he quickly became the bridge-head between President Rajapaksa’s government and the military. The Rajapaksa brothers fused political commitment to a pre-set military goal. “He (Gotabaya) was embraced and accepted by the military and his was a legitimate voice in the
   Army,” said a senior official in the President Office. Gotabaya communicated the military requirements to the government – men, material and weapons.

   His brother and head of the government, President Rajapaksa, ensured the military got what it wanted. He in turn instructed Gotabaya to tell the Army to go all out and get on with the task. The sixth fundamental of the Rajapaksa Model also had a clause – Basil, the youngest of the Rajapaksa brothers. “Neither Mahinda nor Basil saw their brother Gotabaya as a political threat to their political aspirations. So they gave him a free hand.” More importantly, Basil was used by President Rajapaksa for political liaison, especially with India.

   SEVENTH FUNDAMENTAL: ACCENT ON YOUNG COMMANDERS
   The other critical element was empowering young officers as GOCs to lead the battle. “I did not select these officers because they are young. But they were appointed as I thought they were the best to command the battle. I went to the lines and picked up the capable people. I had to drop those who had less capacity to lead the battle. Some of them are good for other work like administration activities. Therefore, the good commanders were chosen to command this battle.

   I thought seniority was immaterial if they could not command the soldiers properly. I restructured the Army and changed almost all the aspects of the organization. I made the Sri Lanka Army a more professional Army. Everybody had to work with a sense of professionalism.”

   Eighth Fundamental: Keep Your Neighbors in Loop
   The seventh fundamental was India and an unsigned strategic partnership agreed by New Delhi and Colombo. India played a crucial part in the Sri Lanka military operations by providing intelligence and other kinds of tactical support. “The moral support, whatever support India gave us, is what they should have given to us. It is their duty to help us in this stage,” is President Rajapaksa’s rather candid admission of the Indian involvement. “I can’t demand, I shouldn’t demand anything from a neighboring country. I request.” The first significant request from Colombo was naval intelligence and intelligence on the movement of LTTE owned merchant navy vessels.
   The 15,000 sq km area controlled by the LTTE in northern Sri Lanka known as Vanni was cut off from all land access. The A9 Colombo-Jaffna road ran through it. But in the Southern end was the Vavuniya frontline at Omanthai and in the North beyond the Elephant Pass was the northern frontline. The only way for the LTTE to get its supplies, weapons and other essentials was through the sea route. It had eight ‘warehouse’ ships, vessels that transported “artillery, mortar shells, artillery shells, torpedoes, aircraft, missiles, underwater vehicles, diving equipment, radar, electro-optical devices and night vision equipment.” These ships would travel close to the Sri Lankan coast but beyond the reach of Sri Lanka’s coastal Navy. War material from these ‘warehouse’ ships would be transported into smaller boats protected by Sea Tiger units, which would then make its way to the Sea Tiger bases. This is how the LTTE sustained itself for decades and continually upgraded its conventional military capability through funding provided by the Tamil Diaspora.
   India played a crucial role in choking this well established supply line of the LTTE. This enabled the Sri Lankan armed forces on the ground to make rapid advances. The Sri Lankan Navy led by Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, executed a maritime strategy based on intelligence on LTTE ship movements provided by India. In 2006 the SL Navy had tremendous success when, based on Indian intelligence, it launched operations to destroy six LTTE warehouse vessels. Subsequently, by 2007, two more were destroyed, which completely disrupted the LTTE’s supply line. Some LTTE warehouse ships were located at about 1700 nautical miles, south east of Sri Lanka close to Australia’s exclusive economic zone. SL Navy clearly does not have this capability and this shows how deep and extensive intelligence sharing between India and Colombo have been ever since 2006.
   In a recent interview to the Jane’s Defence Weekly, Admiral Karannagoda said, “It was one of the major turning points in the last 30 years of the conflict. That was the main reason why the LTTE are losing the battle, we did not allow a single supply of replenishment ship to come into (Sri Lankan) waters over the last two and a half years since 2006.”

   In the final analysis the Rajapaksa model is based on a military precept and not a political one. Terrorism has to be wiped out militarily and cannot be tackled politically. That’s the basic premise of the Rajapaksa Model.

9. Nalliah Thayabharan Says:
   February 6th, 2014 at 6:09 am

   Having crushed the LTTE’s multi-pronged offensive launched in early August 2006, President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared that he would have the best officers to lead the war against terror. In the wake of the armed forces beating back LTTE offensives in the Trincomalee and Northern theatres, addressing an SLFP convention at the BMICH in the first week of September 2006, he declared that the cast, creed, and race of an officer would be immaterial, as long as they did their duty.

   In an obvious reference to SLAF chief Air Marshal Roshan Goonetilleke, the President revealed that some people had objected to Goonetilleke’s appointment as he studied at a particular college. They also pointed out that the officer’s father had been critical of the war effort and was not a Buddhist. The President said: “I consulted Gotabhaya regarding the appointment and he said that particular officer was the best choice and should be given the opportunity to command the service.”

   Announcing the liberation of Sampur following a week-long battle at the SLFP convention, the President also referred to the appointment of Maor. General Sarath Fonseka as the Commander of the Army, as he was about to retire (Mahinda says only the best will head the forces––The Island Sept 8, 2006). He told the media at Temple Trees in the run-up to the last presidential poll in Jan, 2010, that Sarath Fonseka’s appointment, too, had been made on the recommendation of his brother, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, who was present at the meeting. During the almost three year long offensive there couldn’t have been at least one occasion where President Mahinda Rajapaksa taking a decision regarding security matter without Gotabhaya being consulted. In fact, there has been absolutely no change in the situation even after the conclusion of the conflict.

   As troops gradually made headway in the eastern theatre of operations, an influential section within the ruling coalition and the Opposition launched a destabilisation campaign. They triggered chaos inside the ruling coalition causing uncertainty. The political crisis threatened the on-going military action on the eastern front. Defence Secretary Rajapaksa was quick to realise the danger of political turmoil, as he felt the enemy could take advantage of the situation. The Opposition resented the Defence Secretary’s bold statements as regards the political crisis. They accused him of interfering in political issues. But, the Defence Secretary always voiced his opinion much to the consternation of some politicians.

   In a brief interview with The Island published on Feb 25, 2007, an irate Defence Secretary lashed out at those undermining the war effort by propagating lies.

   The Opposition alleged that government forces were moving into LTTE-held areas in the Eastern Province, while the LTTE was given the opportunity to run the Northern Province. The Opposition claimed that the SLA wasn’t confronting the LTTE, hence allowing large enemy forces to withdraw to the Vanni through the jungles north of Weli Oya. The propaganda operation succeeded to a large extent, with some even within the establishment suspecting significant battlefield victories achieved by the SLA on the Eastern Front. The Opposition sought to discredit the military in a bid to undermine President Rajapaksa and Gotabhaya.

   In a front-page story captioned ‘Gotabhaya vows not to be distracted by political chaos with strap line Fresh offensive gets underway’, The Island quoted Rajapaksa as having said: “Absolute rubbish. See what is happening on the ground, not only in the East, but the North as well. We are working to a plan and won’t be distracted by unfair criticism.” The Defence Secretary was responding to Opposition allegations that the SLA was moving into the Eastern Province, while the LTTE took over the Northern Province.

   The Defence Secretary said that whatever the Opposition said, the LTTE was on the run. He pointed out the absurdity in Opposition claims in the wake of the LTTE abandoning their important bases in the Eastern Province, leaving behind artillery pieces, mortars and explosives-laden boats. Rajapaksa stressed that squabbling, petty politics and insignificant disputes shouldn’t be allowed to impede the war effort.

   In spite of losing some territory, the LTTE still felt that President Rajapaksa couldn’t sustain a major military campaign in the Eastern Province. The TNA believed in the LTTE’s wherewithal to thwart the UPFA’s military as well as political strategies, and the UNP, too, believed that the UPFA would fail on the war front, hence they attacked President Rajapaksa on a broad front. The Colombo based diplomatic community and the NGO circuit, too, believed that the government couldn’t sustain the offensive much longer as a massive LTTE onslaught was imminent. Even the destruction of the LTTE’s floating warehouses on the high seas didn’t influence their thinking. They believed Sri Lanka’s streak of luck would be short-lived.

   What they didn’t realise was that the SLA was preparing to open a new front west of Vavuniya even before the successful conclusion of its campaign in the Eastern Province. The Army chief, Lt. Gen. Fonseka strongly felt the need to sustain maximum possible pressure on the LTTE in both provinces. Forces had faith in the Sinha Regiment veteran and his capacity to prosecute a ground offensive under extremely difficult conditions. Veteran of many a battle, Lt. Gen. Fonseka pushed for a all-out war on many fronts in the Northern theatre. Nothing would have contributed to that strategy more than opening a new front, thereby compelling the LTTE to commit some of its best units to confront the SLA. Fighting the LTTE on multiple fronts wouldn’t have been realistic unless the government increased the SLA’s strength. The President authorised the increase in the SLA’s strength so that the army would have the much needed flexibility. By March 2007, the SLA was ready to launch the newly raised 57 Division with the intention of liberating Kilinochchi. Before discussing progress on the Vanni front, it would be important to examine the political challenges faced by President Rajapaksa.

   The entire war effort could have collapsed if the President didn’t overcome political obstacles in his path. The President to a large extent depended on his brothers, Gotabhaya and Basil, to ensure political stability, prompting the Opposition to call the ruling coalition ‘sahodara samagama’ (a company comprising brothers).

   Having won the Nov. 17, 2005 presidential election by a margin of about 200,000 votes thanks to the LTTE-TNA combination depriving the main Opposition candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe of the Tamil vote, the LTTE resumed major attacks in the first week of Dec. 2005. In January 2006, the LTTE destroyed an Israeli built Shaldag class Fast Attack Craft (FAC) off Trincomalee and in April, May and Dec targeted, Lt. Gen. Fonseka, ‘Pearl Cruiser’ carrying 700 officers and men and Gotabhaya, respectively.

   Had the LTTE succeeded in executing any one of them, Sri Lanka’s war on terror could have suffered irrevocable damage. The LTTE launched eelam war IV in the first week of Aug 2006 but quickly lost the initiative. By early Feb. 2007, the military campaign in the Eastern Province reached a decisive stage, with the SLA readying to open a new front in the Vanni theatre.

   The Defence Secretary in late Jan. 2007 indicated the government’s intention to continue with the offensive. Having visited newly liberated Vakarai, one of the strongest LTTE bases in the Eastern Province, the Defence Secretary said that the on-going successful military operations would influence further military action. The LTTE was in disarray and couldn’t carry out a phased withdrawal. They fled, leaving a vast quantity of equipment, including two 152 mm artillery pieces, one 120 mm mortar, two 12,7 mm anti-aircraft guns (Forces’ success in the East to influence further military action––The Island Jan 25, 2007).

   An influential section within the SLFP initiated its destabilisation bid. The then Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera, who had played a pivotal role in helping Prime Minister Rajapaksa to secure the PA presidential election candidature, opposed the President’s political and military strategies. Samaraweera challenged Rajapaksa much to the chagrin of the Rajapaksas. After consulting those close to him, the President, in early Feb. 2007, warned the rebellious members to fall in line or face the consequences. The President felt that failure to act swiftly and decisively could cause a political turmoil. Basil, too, accepted the urgent need to arrest the situation, while Gotabhaya asserted that the delay to ensure political stability could be an impediment to the on-going military campaign. Some government members, including several vociferous supporters of the Rajapaksas remained silent as they felt the battle for supremacy in the SLFP could go either way. No one wanted to take chances. The rebellion was gathering momentum. Then on Feb 8, 2007, the President gave an dire warning to the ginger group. Addressing a group of newly appointed electoral organisers at Temple Trees, he emphasised that he wouldn’t allow any group within the SLFP to challenge his authority. He warned that he wouldn’t succumb to pressure and added that those disgruntled elements could leave the party. The warning was given in the wake of Ministers Mangala Samaraweera, Anura Bandaranaike and Sripathy Sooriyaarachchi skipping an Emergency vote in Parliament. The bone of contention was the President accommodating a group of UNP MPs among the government ranks to strengthen his position in Parliament, due to the JVP spurning his invitation to join the government. Basil played a pivotal role in enticing Opposition members to join government ranks.

   At the behest of the SLFP leadership, Ven. Vatinapaha Somananda thera, on behalf of the All Island Clergy Association urged the President to take punitive action against those who skipped the Emergency vote. The stage of was set for a critical phase of an operation targeting dissidents.

   While beleaguered UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe was fighting to reassert his authority in the wake of a powerful section of the UNP parliamentary group throwing its weight behind President Mahinda Rajapaksa along with the SLMC as well as the CWC, which contested the parliamentary poll (April 2004) on the UNP ticket, the President stripped Samaraweera and Bandaranaike of their ministerial portfolios. The President bluntly told the SLFPdissidents to continue their campaign sans ministerial portfolios. A visibly upset Anura Bandaranaike called for CBK’s support to go on the offensive. He called CBK to join a media briefing in Colombo aimed at targeting the Rajapaksa brothers, in spite of him being warned not to cause further problems. The President sent a message to Bandaranaike through business tycoon Harry Jayawardena, a mutual friend, not to side with Samaraweera. Bandaranaike was warned to keep his distance from Samaraweera. CWC leader Arumugam Thondaman quickly realised that the dissidents’ move could end up in a catastrophe. Thondaman rushed to President Rajapaksa to reaffirm his support. Having sacked those who challenged his authority, a confident Rajapaksa on Feb 11, 2007 left for the Maldives on a three-day state visit. The President invited three UNP defectors, Milinda Moragoda, Prof. G.L. Peiris and Rohitha Bogollagama to join his delegation for talks with Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. The decision to go ahead with an overseas visit highlighted his confidence in Gotabhaya and Basil (Anura wants Chandrika to battle Rajapaksa brothers; SLFP seeks more UNP crossovers and MR confident dissidents helpless, leaves for Male––The Island Feb 11, 2007)

   Much to the surprise of Bandaranaike, Samaraweera and Sooriyaarachchi, those who had been in touch with them and pledged their support for the attack on the Rajapaksas remained mum. The President’s decision to strip dissidents of ministerial portfolios wrong-footed them all. The JVP on Feb 11, 2007 issued a statement criticising the President’s move against Samaraweera and Sooriyaarachchi. The JVP politburo didn’t refer to Bandarnaike. The JVP alleged that the President was targeting some of those who had supported his presidential bid, while embracing those undermined him. The SLFP leadership asked the JVP to mind its own business. Among those who publicly supported the Rajapaksas move against rebels within days after them being stripped of portfolios were ministers Anura Priyadarshana Yapa, Nimal Siripala de Silva, Pavitra Wanniarachchi, Dilan Perera, Ranjith Siyambalapitiya, Sarath Amunugama and Jagath Pushpakumara (JVP sheds tears for Mangala and Sripathy, silent on Anura with strap line Mind your own business-SLFP––The Island Feb 12, 2007)

   Although the JVP strongly backed Prime Minister Rajapaksa’s presidential election campaign in Nov 2005, the President couldn’t have forgotten how the JVP almost succeeded in blocking him from being appointed the Prime Minister immediately after the April 2, 2004 parliamentary polls. The JVP pushed for the appointment of Lakshman Kadirgamar as the Prime Minister of the UPFA government. The JVP proposed that if Kadirgamar wasn’t acceptable because of his ethnicity either Anura Bandaranaike or Maithripala Sirisena should be the next Prime Minister. The JVP went to the extent of making it a condition for its continued support. Due to its unexpected success in securing 39 seats, the JVP was in a position to exert pressure on the SLFP leadership. The JVP did everything possible to undermine Rajapaksa, particularly during Opposition protests against the UNP signing the Ceasefire agreement with the LTTE, in Feb 2002. The JVP always considered Rajapaksa a serious threat to their future political plans. Having undermined Rajapaksa for years, the JVP had no option but to support his presidential bid in Nov 2005, but refused to support him in parliament, thereby created uncertainty. Realising the danger, the President quickly reached an agreement with the UNP as early as Feb 2006. A section of the UNP considered the president’s move as an admission of weakness. Within weeks after signing of the Memorandum of Understanding by SLFP General Secretary Minister Maithripala Sirisena and UNP Chairman Malik Samarawickrema, the UNP boasted that the UNP would form a government in April 2006. The President responded by enticing a section of the UNP parliamentary group to join him.

10. aloy Says:
    February 6th, 2014 at 9:04 am

    Is this a distortion of facts?. Was it not US that gave the location of the floating armories?. I remember Gota also stated that fact somewhere. India’s satellite wasn’t even launched by that time.

11. Lorenzo Says:
    February 6th, 2014 at 12:40 pm

    It was US govt. that gave us coordinates of LTTE ships. NOT Endian govt.

    USA didn’t love us. They feared LTTE ships plying weapons for Somali pirates too.

12. Mr. Bernard Wijeyasingha Says:
    February 6th, 2014 at 3:14 pm

    Lorenzo: good point but keep in mind, in international politics there is no such thing as love. Only the goals justify the means.

13. Lorenzo Says:
    February 6th, 2014 at 3:22 pm

    BW,

    Absolutely!

    In international affairs there are NO friends or enemies. ONLY interests.

14. SA Kumar Says:
    February 7th, 2014 at 4:26 am

    Why Only Sinhalese Defending Sri Lanka Against UNHRC Threats – sadly partly Agreed !
    because DS to MR not full filed their promised (eg:13 Plus etc…)
    But We defended last Indian invaders not you Sinhalese even though IPKF gave us NEP in gold plate !!!

    United Provincial Council Of Mother Lanka, No short cut !

    Fully implement 13A & 6A & Resident 100,000 Bhuddist Sinhala Family in NEP !!!

15. Charles Says:
    February 7th, 2014 at 6:46 am

    Nalliah Thayabharan puts it so beautifully,

    “It was the Sri Lankan Army that braved LTTE attacks and mines to save 294,000 Tamil speaking Sri Lankans. These brave soldiers are the rightful owners of our motherland including Jaffna peninsula.”

    But Nanda “s….ts on it.

16. Lorenzo Says:
    February 7th, 2014 at 2:11 pm

    Charles,

    NO. Nanda PUT it into perspective.

    The military SAVED SL but who gets credit and who calls the shots? The politicians. That is NO PROBLEM as long as they don’t REVERSE the MILITARY victory. But MR has reversed the military victory. North is ONCE AGAIN under the LTTE partial rule.

    Tamils in the north are AGAIN waiting to be liberated. NOT by politicians but by the military.

17. Nanda Says:
    February 7th, 2014 at 2:30 pm

    “We have to now reckon with greed, dishonesty, power struggles, lies about the country spread around the world, crime, hatred, anger, lack of commitment, thuggery, indiscipline, drugs, murder, and everything else. What is the common denominator? Not the soil of our beloved homeland – it is the people who create all of the above.”
    -Anjalika Silva USA

    Most people here are not AGAINST the motherland.

    THOSE WHO PRAISE the people who created “crime, hatred, anger, lack of commitment, thuggery, indiscipline, drugs, murder” are certainly against the country too. Because they do not have the wisdom to understand their contribution towards destuction of motherland by not identifying ROOT cause of the destruction.

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