By Shivanthi ranasinghe Courtesy Ceylon Today

The only progress vis-a-vis the prevailing economic crisis is the unfounded report that the IMF may consider approving the USD 2.9 billion Extended Fund Facility (EFF), fondly known as the bailout package”, even without China’s formal assurance of debt-restructuring support. Even if we do finally get IMF’s assistance, which we have been hankering since March 2022, we do not seem to have a clear plan to execute it in order to strengthen our economy. Instead, the objective appears to be to gain our creditors’ confidence so that we may continue to borrow to live as we did before – from loan to loan. 

Despite this lack of progress on the economic front and vision for a better economy, the political focus is on the Local Government (LG) elections and the full implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution (13A). As the LG elections are due, there is some rational for the political interest. However, such an explanation for the sudden interest in implementing the 13A in its full force is absent. 

This thus begs the questions as the reason(s) for President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s sudden interest in implementing the 13A in full as well as the timing. Even if President Wickremesinghe personally believed that the 13A should be implemented in full, surely he would know the timing is bad. After all, he is one of our most experienced politicians. 

As President Wickremesinghe himself admits, economically we are in for a rough ride. The Government is being forced to take many unpopular decisions. The Government is thus in need of support from all political fronts – even the Opposition. At a time when President’s main supporting party, the SLPP, is divided into many smaller enclaves, bringing the most controversial Amendment to the forefront is, without question, foolish. This President Wickremesinghe would know as he had burnt his fingers many times in the past over this issue. Thus, this emphasises the question, why now. 

The 13A’s troubled past

The 13A – was introduced to our Constitution 36 years ago in 1987. Therefore, to still be debating over it is strange, to say the least. These issues are yet unresolved due to a number of reasons. Understanding the sudden urge to bulldoze over these concerns to implement it in full will help understand the reasons for this 13A – completely irrelevant to present day crisis – to precipitate to the forefront. 

The 13A’s history is not pretty. It was forced into our Constitution literally at gunpoint. The year 1987 was a fateful one for Sri Lanka. The Military was successfully containing a terrorist issue that had been simmering since 1975, but was growing out of control since 1983. Though just four years since the explosion of events that led to a full blown war against terrorism, the country had already suffered significantly. 

However, in a surprise move, India intervened and violated our airspace to drop dhal, brinjals and whatnot over the troubled territories in the guise of humanitarian concerns. India’s involvement in this matter was most unfortunate and unnecessary and cost both countries heavily. 

Initially, India’s interest in Sri Lanka’s internal troubles was simple, even if bizarre. In mid 1970s, India was trying to balance the much needed Tamil Nadu support. Indira Gandhi’s Government was fast becoming unpopular and South India was one of the last bastions that still supported Indira’s Government. This was the primary reason for India to allow Tamil insurgents seek sanctuary on Indian soil. 

This soon expanded to funding, training and arming Tamil youth to engage in subversive acts against the Island nation. Whether this expansiveness was still to balance internal politics or had the objective(s) changed on a different agenda is a question we are yet to fully analyse. 

Sri Lanka, at the time, was under the impression that the bilateral relations between the two countries were strong, despite ignoring India’s concerns to support Pakistan in 1971. In any case, national security was not Sirima Bandaranaike’s strong suits. Therefore, her Government never addressed the budding issue with India – even after her Jaffna Mayor Alfred Duraiappah was assassinated. 

Her successor, President JR Jayewardene too, did not address the problem directly with India – despite Indira Gandhi been ousted by political opponent Morarji Desai, who had the support from most political entities in India. Instead, Sri Lanka forged closer relations with the US in the hope that the bigger power would offer us protection from India’s unwarranted aggressiveness. It was in the days of the Cold War when India had sided with Russia. Clearly, that government had not learnt much from the fiasco of inviting the Dutch to oust the Portuguese. 

Sri Lanka’s – stance with the US gave India the legitimacy to support terrorism in Sri Lanka – an illegal act. However, Sri Lanka fought the war on her own, though it had good support from Pakistan, China, Israel, Singapore and South Africa. When Sri Lanka was winning, India intervened but the US continued to stay out of it. 

India communicated its full intention to launch a full-force Military retaliation against the Island nation if Sri Lanka hindered its intervention in any manner. Given less than an hour’s notice by the then External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh, to the Sri Lankan High Commissioner Bernard Tilakaratna, Sri Lanka had to allow her airspace to be violated. Soon after Sri Lanka acceded to the Indo-Lanka Accord on 29.07.1987 with the Indian Naval presence in Sri Lankan territorial waters. 

The Accord led to the 13A. President Jayewardene had to employ extraordinary measures to ensure the passage of the 13A into the Constitution. This included keeping the government parliamentarians in near house-arrest conditions. 

Interestingly, his Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa – father of current Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa – could not be coerced even then to lend his support to the Accord. Thus, young Premadasa’s support to the full 13A’s implementation is very curious, especially as he always pledges to continue his father’s legacy. 

Who was in Favour of the 13A?

President Jayewardene’s shrewdness is often compared to the cunningness of a fox. Thus, even though the 13A created nine provinces and devolved power, President Jayewardene never enacted Land or Police powers. He also invited India to send in their own troops to ensure the smooth transition of terrorists to mainstream politics. 

He obviously predicted that it would not only be his own Parliament that would object to India’s solution. LTTE too rejected the 13A and took cudgels against India for short changing” them. Very quickly, relations between India and the LTTE deteriorated to the point they in 1991 assassinated Rajiv Gandhi – the very person who intervened on their behalf, violated a dozen international laws and stopped the Sri Lankan Military from eradicating their existence. 

In the meantime, President Jayewardene had a new headache. Opposing the Indian intervention, 13A, Provincial Councils and the power devolved, the JVP who was in relatively good terms with the UNP first took to streets and then to arms. Suddenly, both North and South of the Island were ablaze. Though the war was by two very different forces, they both bitterly opposed the 13A.  

Until the end of the war with the LTTE, neither the North nor East could implement even one letter of the 13A. It was only after the areas were cleared off the terrorists that the two provinces were able to hold provincial council elections and establish the councils. 

It is thus interesting that the TNA, that was LTTE’s one time political proxy and who always maintained that the LTTE was the North and East Tamils’ sole representative is now pushing the 13A’s full implementation. In fact, TNA (after the LTTE’s demise) has on number of occasions have asked for India’s intervention to have the 13A implemented fully. 

The JVP suffered tremendously in the ‘88-‘89 insurgency and lost almost their entire leadership. Even though they have since returned to the political stream and a couple of decades have passed, there are many who would not forget or forgive the many atrocities the JVP committed during this era. They thus remain politically discredited. Yet today,  reaction to President Wickremesinghe pledges to fully implement the 13A is not different to the proverbial deaf elephant’s reaction to music. 

By 2017, much of the drama of the late 1980s has long passed. Yet when Ranil Wickremesinghe, as the Yahapalana Government’s Prime Minister, tried to breath life into this in the form of a new Constitution, it was the Muslim and Tamil parties, notably from the Central Province that refused to support it. 

Thus it is obvious that Sri Lanka is deeply divided over this issue. It is clearly not a majority-minority complex where the Sinhalese as the majority have sided against the aspirations of the collective minority communities. On the contrary. This is being opposed by many, irrespective of race or religion. 

This brings forth the questions as to who really needs the 13A implemented in full and why. If the majority of Sri Lankans are against it, we must explore the possibility of any geopolitical angle that might be pressurising our politicians. Simultaneously, we cannot overlook the probability of a pledge simply made to gain mileage in the election race. 

ranasingheshivanthi
@gmail.com

(The views and opinions expressed in this article are writer’s own and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Ceylon Today)

By Shivanthi Ranasinghe