KAMALIKA PIERIS

Neil Quintus Dias   commonly known as N.Q. Dias, was  a member of the Ceylon Civil Service, recruited in 1936. N.Q. Dias  was known for planning and executing many of the nationalist policies of the  1956 government . NQ was the Permanent Secretary of Defence and Foreign Affairs from 1961 to 1965,  also serving as the de facto Chief Adviser to Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike.

 NQ on right .

NQ was not only Permanent Secretary Defence and External affairs,  but also a powerful public servant with much influence over Mrs. Bandaranaike  and therefore feared and respected even by Cabinet ministers, said  Neville  Jayaweera.  NQ Dias was always soft and gentle in tone, but that silken exterior concealed a core of steel and resolve, added Jayaweera. Neville Jayaweera was Government Agent of Jaffna (1963-1966)  during this time. 

 I wish to set on record  three components of Dias remarkable strategic thinking,  which qualifies NQ as Sri Lanka greatest strategic thinker of modern times, said Jayaweera.

 In an interview with me, in 1963 probably,  NQ firstly wanted to set up a chain of military enclaves in the north, this had another strategic aim, apart from throttling an armed uprising of the Tamils. That was to preempt another coup such as the 1962 one.  He wanted to disperse the army, from Echelon and Panagoda so that they could not get together to stage a coup.

 Second was a plan to strengthen relations with Beijing as a countervailing power to India and neutralize the latter influence in Sri Lanka affairs.  He was hoping to arrange for Sirimavo to visit China soon.

Thirdly was the plan to clean out the military top command as far as possible of elements he considered incapable of patriotism , principally the Roman Catholic and to raise new infantry regiments which would owe their allegiance to Sirimavo. The Sinha regiment was the first of these.

In his capacity of Secretary for Defense NQ was perfectly entitled to consider all this and to plan well ahead for the suppression of any anticipated armed rebellion and intervention from India. Sri Lanka is much in his debt, concluded Jayaweera.(Sunday Island .19.10.2008 p 14 )

NQ was of the view that within two decades of the 1960s the Tamils would take to arms.  NQ’s anticipation of a future armed Tamil uprising and of India interference on  the side of  Tamil Separatist Movement  has not been given sufficient publicity, said Jayaweera. 

NQ  had  told Jayaweera, in 1963,  that the Tamil protest would develop into an armed rebellion and that the government must prepare from now to meet that. He was also of the view that the Tamil professionals, lawyers and doctors,  will soon lose control of the Tamil cause and that a new generation of militant youth will take over. Jayaweera as GA, Jaffna,  was  to help NQ develop counter measures for the anticipated uprising.

NQ also predicted that India would someday in the not so distant future support a Tamil uprising in Sri Lanka and Tamilnadu will be the source of illicit arms for the rebellion. Therefore a complete new naval strategy for Sri Lanka was needed.

NQ  wanted  a chain of military camps to encircle the Northern Province all the way form Arippu, Marichcikatti, Pallai and Thalvapadu in the Mannar distinct, through Pooneryn, Karainagar, Palaly, Point Pedro, Thirukovil and Elephant Pass in the Jaffna district, on to Mullativu, Vavuniya  and Trincomalee in the east.   Within one year of  my arriving in Jaffna the military camps were started. By 1966 all  the camps had been set up, said Jayaweera.

 It should be noted however, that NQ  had  offered these suggestions  to the government  two years earlier .in January 1961,    ITAK  had  launched a Satyagraha  in in Jaffna against Sinhala Only, led by S. J. V. Chelvanayagam . The protests soon spread to other parts of the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

In April 1961, Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike declared a state of emergency in the Northern Province and ordered the army to squash the Satyagraha. NQ used this to propose an increase of armed forces deployed to the northern and eastern province. He called for the formation of military bases in Arippu, Maricchikatti, Pallai, Thalvapadu,  Pooneryn, Karainagar, Palaly, Point Pedro, Elephant Pass, Mullaitivu and Trincomalee to counter possible rise of Tamil separatism.

  We now return to Neville Jayaweera’s recollections of 1963. There were already two military camps of platoon strength in Pallai in Mannar and in Palaly in Jaffna in the 1960s recalled  Jayaweera, and a rudimentary naval presence in Karainagar. NQ wanted to upgrade them. This operation was done under disguise.

 To avoid massive protests from Tamils over any attempt to establish  permanent military camps there, NQ   said that the camps were there to combat  illicit immigration and smuggling.  NQ had already obtained  publicity in the press against smuggling, saying it made Sri Lanka annually lose much income.

There was already an operation known as “Operations Monty”  set up in 1952 to stop illegal immigration of Indian Tamils. NQ  converted this to Task Force Anti Illicit Immigration (TFAII).. Operations Monty was formally renamed as Task Force Anti Illicit Immigration in 1963. It was a permanent formation in support of  the navy  coastal patrols and police operations.

TFAII had its headquarters at Palaly and had units deployed from Mollikulam  to Kokilai. Army camps were set up in Silavathurai, Thalladi, Talaimannar, Pooneryn, Valvettiturai, Madagala, Thondamannar, Mullaitivu and Kokilai. In addition there were  several smaller detachments of 5-10 soldiers each  in selected locations.TFAII  functioned from 1963 to 1981. In 1981 it was terminated with the onset of the Eelam war.

NQ had arranged for special phone link from the TFAII to Jayaweera direct as he thought that the normal telephone lines were being tapped at the Jaffna end.  

Tamil Separatist Movement under Chelvanayagam, saw all this and objected. Chelva had complained on 22 July 1962 that a  fishing boat had been stopped by the navy at Kayts  and atrocities committed.  Fishermen had been  ill treated,  fishing nets damaged, banians torn.

 NQ   replied  on 22.8.1962. He said the  navy   had  checked the boat  for possible illegal activity. The fishermen were not ill treated, no banians were torn. The fishing nets were intact on board.   The crew  made no allegations of atrocities,  assault or tearing banians in their complaint to the authorities later on, either. It should be noted  that  navy is engaged in anti illicit immigration and  anti smuggling in the northern coast. This letter is held in the Chelvanayagam archives in Toronto, Canada. https://collections.digital.utsc.utoronto.ca/islandora/object/tamil%3A10300#page/1/mode/1up

NQ ridiculed the policy of building a navy comprised of mine sweepers and frigates such as Vijaya and Gajabahu.   They were of no use for checking gun running in the Palk Strait.  NQ  had wanted Vijaya and Gajabahu scrapped and replaced with small fast gun boats.  NQ had asked whether the Gal Oya Board could turn out boats that the navy could  use for anti smuggling work.  

NQ had asked US ambassador for PT boats.  The Patrol Torpedo boatwas a motor torpedo boat used by the United States Navy in World War II. It was small, fast, and inexpensive to build, valued for its maneuverability and speed. The US  ambassador had said that Sri Lanka did not have the technical skills nor the infrastructure to service PT boats.

NQ ridiculed the jet fighters and said that what Sri Lanka needed was a squadron of propeller driven ground support fighters for helping infantry on the ground and for interdicting gun running across the Palk Strait. He talked of buying a squadron of fighter bombers called Sky Raider which were then in use by the US in Viet Nam.

Jayaweera recalled that NQ wanted Jayaweera to force   ‘confrontations’  in Jaffna upon the Tamils at every turn and establish the government’s absolute ascendency over them at every crisis.  Instead of forcing a crisis on Tamil leaders I talked around every impending crisis and aborted them and did not establish the government absolute ascendancy over them, said Jayaweera.

NQ did not trust the Roman Catholic officer corp of the armed service. He flushed them out progressively and  put officers from Buddhist schools in key positions.  NQ took steps to change the composition of the army to match the demographically ratios of the population, increasing the number of Sinhala Buddhist officers in the armed forces, said Jayaweera.

 NQ also said that Sri Lanka foreign policy had to be upgraded. Sri Lanka  had no coherent foreign policy and was too dependent on the west and trusted the good will of India which he said was a huge mistake. NQ believed that Indian had sinister designs on Sri Lanka, if not to take it over complete at least to keep her permanently disabled and depend on India said Jayaweera. ( Jayaweera. Jaffna exorcising the past and holding the vision)

 Sri Lanka should veer away and forge new links, said NQ. He was planning to open up closer relations with China .Dias had foreseen the need to seek out China as a countervailing power against India. He sent Mrs. B on a goodwill mission to China in 1964, observed Jayaweera.  (Concluded)