KAMALIKA PIERIS

The Ceylon Tamils aggressively pursued Settler Colonization after the island gained Independence. The British rulers left without allocating territory to the Tamil settlers, and the Tamil settlers found themselves face to face with the indigenous group they had hoped to displace. That group was now in power. But the Tamil Settlers had no intention of giving up their Settler ambitions. They were going to challenge the locals and get what they want.

 The Tamil Separatist Movement was able to push forward two Agreements and two Acts of Parliament all intended to ensure that the North and East remained exclusively Tamil with the possibility of partition later on. The four ‘instruments’ are Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact, (1957) Dudley- Chelvanayagam Pact, (1965) the District Development Councils Act (1987) and the Provincial Councils Act (1987).

The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact of 1957 is   a good example of Settler strategy. The Tamil Separatist Movement was alarmed when the MEP won General Election of April 1956.  In August 1956, Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi ( Lanka Tamil State Party)  ITAK  held its party convention in Trincomalee . It  made four demands on the MEP government .  The government must respond  to these demands by August 20, 1957. [1] If not ITAK would   engage in satyagraha.

The demands were:

1. The establishment of an autonomous Tamil state or states on a linguistic basis within a Federal Union of Ceylon.
2. The restoration of the Tamil language to its rightful place, enjoying absolute parity of status with Sinhala as an official language of this country.
3. The restoration of the citizenship and franchise rights to Tamil workers in the plantation districts by the repeal of the present citizenship laws.
4. The immediate cessation of all policies of colonizing the traditionally Tamil-speaking areas with Sinhalese people

The MEP  government was busy fussing over  language . The government had   decided to do away with   the English letters on vehicle number plates, replacing them  with  ‘Sri’. The Tamil politicians protested and demanded that the Tamil ‘Shree’ also be substituted , despite  the fact that there was no letter ‘Sri’ in the Tamil alphabet.

On January 19  ITAK began an anti-Sri campaign in the northeast. Vehicles began running with Tamil letters. The ‘Sinhala’ Sri was changed into the Sanskrit derived  ‘Shree’ .A counter-campaign began in the Sinhala majority provinces. Tamil letters were tar-brushed or blacked out on street signs and name boards. There were widespread incidents of  friction on a minor scale.

ITAK  then declared that when government ministers and deputy ministers came  north east  for official purposes, satyagrahis would surround the  places where ministers were scheduled to go and block their entry.

 Cabinet Ministers W. Dahanayake and M. Marikkar were mobbed in Batticaloa. Stanley de Zoysa was treated to a massive show of black flags in Mannar. Deputy Minister of Labour M.P de Z. Siriwardena who went by  mail train to Jaffna found his path blocked outside the railway station by youths led by Appapillai Amirthalingam. Siriwardena returned to Colombo by the next Yarl Devi.” [2]

Since the government  was not doing anything about the  four demands ITAK  eventually  announced that it   would hold  its satyagraha on  August 20, 1957. Volunteers numbering 25, 000 were registered. Some Sinhala leaders began a move to mobilize 100, 000 volunteers to combat the Tamil campaign. A major showdown seemed inevitable.

In view of this impending clash, SWRD decided  to meet Chelvanayagam. This was at  the personal initiative of the Prime Minister himself, said D.B.S. Jeyaraj . The first meeting was held on June 22  1957 at the Premier’s residence in Horagolla. Two Tamil lawyers, P. Navaratnarajah QC and A.C. Nadarajah acted as intermediaries. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and Stanley de Zoysa  represented the government;  S.J.V.Chelvanayagam, C. Vanniyasingham, N.R. Rajavarothayam, V.A. Kandiah, E.M.V. Naganathan and V. Navaratnam from  ITAK .

ITAK made its position clear. ITAK wanted a federal government. ITAK pointed out that SWRD had advocated this some years ago. SWRD said that though he had  suggested federalism then, he had  now changed his mind.Besides he had no mandate   for introducing federalism. [3]

SWRD asked ITAK to suggest something else. ITAK went home and  consulted former Law College Principal Brito Muthunayagam  and A. J.  Wilson, a political scientist and son in law of Chelvanayagam . ITAK looked at the constitutions of several federal countries and took  Northern Ireland  as its model.

 Former Kopay MP. C. Vanniyasingham and ex-Kayts MP. V. Navaratnam  drafted a new scheme and forwarded it to  Prime Minister . In the new scheme ITAK  wanted  the Northeast  to be a separate but subordinate state with a unicameral legislature and a cabinet. External affairs, defence, currency, stamps, customs, inter-regional transport, would remain with the central government. Block grants would be made by Colombo while domestic taxation could also supplement revenue. Policing was a state responsibility. The subordinate state would be represented in Colombo through elected MPs. There would be a central cabinet minister for Tamil affairs.

A second round of talks was held at S.W.R.D’s Rosemead Place residence. Chelvanayagam, Vanniyasingham, Naganathan and Navaratnam represented the ITAK. Bandaranaike pointed out that the  ITAK  draft amounted to federalism. He suggested that a  scheme be  drawn up in point form,  emphasizing administrative de-centralization.  He  objected to words like ‘parliament’ and ‘cabinet’ saying they  indicated  a separate state. [4]

A Regional Councils  Bill  had been published in draft form in the Gazette of 17. May 1957. Bandaranaike  suggested  that ITAK should  take a look at it. ITAK did so and decided to include  Regional Councils in the BC Pact.

Analysts noted that  this Regional Councils Bill    never came up in Parliament, and thus escaped public scrutiny. It disappeared with the disappearance of the Pact they said. But it has been reproduced in K.M de Silva’s book ” Devolution in Sri Lanka: S.W.R.D Bandaranaike and the debate on power sharing” (ICES, Kandy 1996) as Document VII, p 72 –

ITAK delegation   revised its  document,  as requested by SWRD, but  the original proposals were retained . ITAK replaced ‘Parliament’ with ‘Regional council’  and ‘Cabinet’ was  replaced by  ‘Board of Directors.’ Thereafter a series of discussions took place between Stanley de Zoysa, and ITAK leaders. The  Prime Minister  did not participate but proposed many changes through Stanley de Zoysa.  ITAK was persuaded to accept most of these changes.

But on one point the ITAK remained firm. The ITAK wanted the northeast to form one single regional council. S.W.R.D. was equally firm.  There cannot be a merger. North could be one unit, but the east must be  separated from the north and it  should have two or more units. Eventually it was  agreed that the north would  be one council and the east be divided into two or more councils. The councils could merge if desired .Existing boundaries could be re-demarcated if necessary.

The final meeting,  with several Cabinet ministers also present, took place on July 25, 1957 at the Prime Minister’s office. It began at 7 p.m.  and ended at 2 am the next day.  The Cabinet ministers were firm that the status of Sinhala as official language should not be eroded. After protracted discussion a compromise was suggested by  Minister William Silva that Tamil be recognized as the language of the national minorities. Tamil was to be the language of administration in the  north east. [5]

Several ministers led by Philip Gunewardena refused to delegate their powers to the future North and East councils. The ITAK members retired to another room while cabinet ministers sorted out the issue. Subsequently ‘line’ ministers agreed to devolve their powers. Lastly,    Prime Minister  was willing to stop Sinhala colonization  and also agreed to a  land settlement policy that  suited ITAK.  V. Navaratnam then read out in point form  what  had been agreed to.  But Navaratnam  told Jeyaraj, many years later,  that ITAK  was not happy with  some aspects of the agreement.

The  media were called in at 2.30 am. Chelvanayagam said an agreement had been worked out and that the details will be given by the  Prime Minister . S.W.R.D. then read out from V. Navaratnam’s notes. The  media asked ITAK whether they were satisfied. Naganathan, Vanniyasingham, Rajavarothayam and Amirthalingam  said they were satisfied. Chelvanayakam then  said that the ITAK would postpone its  satyagraha scheduled for August 20.

ITAK realized some time later that  no actual  pact had been signed by Bandaranaike or Chelvanayakam . There was nothing in writing to show that an agreement had been entered into. Therefore, the next day,  June 26 ,  Navaratnam drafted in triplicate, the terms and clauses of what is known today as the Banda-Chelva pact  It was in two parts. Part A  was a summary of discussions and agreements reached. Part B  was about the structure, powers and composition of the proposed Regional Councils.

Chelvanayagam went  to the Prime Minister’s office with this document   and obtained SWRD’s endorsement. It was done quietly, away from the media glare, observed Jeyaraj. Bandaranaike was given one copy, Chelvanayagam had the other. Navaratnam kept the third copy. Navaratnam  later told Jeyaraj that his   copy was destroyed by EPRLF militants during the Eelam war. EPRLF had taken  over  Navaratnam ‘s    residence. Navaratnam was in Canada. [6]

 The Bandaranaike – Chelvanayakam Pact, ( see Appendix for the text) was merely an agreement between the Prime Minister and   representatives of  Illankai Tamil Arasu  Kadchi ( Lanka Tamil state Party)  led by S.J.V Chelvanayakam.  It was  accepted  to avoid a threatened mass satyagraha led by  ITAK against the “Sinhala Only’ Bill. It was abrogated, literally torn up , apparently, on April 9, 1958.

When the Bandaranaike -Chelvanayakam Pact was announced it caused great consternation and also a few titters. It was pointed out that the two signatories ‘did not seem to have the same view of the clauses’. Bandaranaike was evasive about the whole thing, while Chelvanayakam was announcing that the colonization of the North and East by the Sinhalese had been effectively stopped.[7]

The media reported that Bandaranaike gave a ‘long laboured statement’ on 12.8.57 with the terms of the agreement ‘tucked away inconspicuously at the end .Politicians said that now at long last they were able to see what the Pact was about.[8]

The Ceylon Daily News of 13.8.57  announced on page 1 that the Prime Minister, had stated that colonization would continue and that the Regional Councils were only for administration. On the same page Chelvanayagam was recorded as stating that Bandaranaike was going back on the 4 point programme agreed on.

Bandaranaike and Chelvanayagam met   again on 14.8.57 and  managed to get their act together. Then they parted. Chelvanayakam to the North, to explain the Pact to the Tamils and Bandaranaike to the South to pacify the apprehensive Sinhalese, some of whom were already hopping mad regarding  matters pertaining to the ‘rightful position’ of the Sinhalese.

ITAK declared, at a special session of its National Convention assembled at the Town Hall, Batticaloa, on 28th July 1957 that State aided Sinhalese colonization of the Northern and Eastern provinces will be effectively stopped forthwith.”   Also that there     would be a large measure of regional self-government’ under the proposed Regional Councils Act.[9] Chelvanayagam’s claim that Sinhala colonization had been stopped    caused ‘great public indignation’ [10]  and in October 1957  all state sponsored major colonization schemes were brought under the   direct control of the  Lands Ministry, as a precaution.[11]

The Ceylon Daily news of 20.9.57 reported that the   Prime Minister  planned to tour the country holding propaganda meetings to explain to the people the correct position in regard to the Pact’ . later Bandaranaike stated that he had been able to ‘persuade the majority of the Sinhalese that  the Pact was fair and just’ [12]

However, there was considerable opposition to the Bandaranaike -Chelvanayagam Pact in the south. At a public rally of the UNP at Victoria Park, Colombo, Dudley Senanayake opposed the ‘Regional division of Ceylon on racial grounds’ and the establishment of a ‘state within a state through Regional Councils’ [13]

Dudley Senanayake, speaking  before the UNP at Sri Kotha queried  Is it right to develop vast irrigation and colonization schemes and hand them over for the exclusive settlement of one race, the Tamils, under Regional Council scheme – when it should benefit the entire nation. The gravity of this concession will be felt when one realizes that most of the major irrigation and colonization schemes such as Heda Oya, Magalawaturan Aru, Yan Oya, Padaviya, Malvatu Oya and Mahaweli Ganga are situated mainly or wholly in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.”[14]

J.R. Jayewardene organized a protest march  against the BC Pact from Colombo to Kandy on October 3rd 1957.Former Gampaha MP S.D.Bandaranayake blocked the march with his supporters at Imbulgoda along the Colombo –Kandy road. There was a hectic stand-off and a large number of policemen were deployed to maintain peace. Bandaranayake  said he had initially blocked the march with only twelve people, gradually hundreds of people had flocked in support voluntarily. The march was called off. But it helped foment adverse public opinion against the B- C Pact. 

The All Ceylon Moors Association led by Sir Razeek Fareed requested a meeting with the  Prime Minister  as they were. perturbed by the Pact. They pointed out that ‘no measures should be contemplated as would make the Ceylon Moors a minority  within a minority”. [15]

The Sinhala Jathika Sangamaya opposed  the BC Pact flatly and unequivocally,  stating that there were no ‘Tamil lands’ all were ‘Sinhala lands’[16]. There was  opposition from three sets of trade unions, Sri Lanka Independent Industries and Commercial Workers Union, Central Council of Ceylon Trade Unions and the Federation of Socialist trade Unions.[17]

The march to Kandy and the subsequent Satyagraha launched by representatives of the Sinhala Jatika Sangamaya and Sri Lanka Sangha Sabhava, created a  wave of opposition to the B-C Pact. 200 Buddhist priests and 300 others squatted outside Bandaranaike’s house on April 9, 1958 demanding the Pact be revoked.

In the face of mounting pressures, from the Sinhala public as well as the Buddhist clergy, on 9th April, 1958   Prime Minister SWRD Bandaranaike publicly disowned the BC Pact[18] and the agreement was publicly torn up.  

Bandaranaike issued a statement regarding the B-C Pact and its abrogation on 15.4.58, where he said Another question that arises is the real intention of the Federal Party. Were they genuine in regard to the agreement they reached with me? Were they only looking upon it as a first step towards something else? If so what is that something else? “[19] The ‘something else’ was of course, the creation of a Tamil state.

 The Tamil Separatist Movement never forgot the Bandaranaike -Chelvanayakam Pact.  The Movement  is still talking about the  Pact   today. It was for them a historic Pact, which marked the first stage of negotiations for the creation of an independent, sovereign Tamil state by statute, with Trincomalee as its capital. It involved the merger of the North and East, and the creation an ethnic Tamil state by employing colonization policies which favored the Tamils, and excluded the Sinhalese.  The north and east would not be converted into Sinhalese majority areas.[20]  

The agreement signed by SWRD Bandaranaike and SJV Chelvanayagam in 1957 was a significant event in the political history of post-independent Sri Lanka, said Jeyaraj. The Prime Minister of the day and the leader of the biggest Tamil political party had come to an understanding which if implemented may have helped contain the ethnic conflict at its nascent stages,. [21]

The Tamil Separatist Movement repeatedly maintains that the Tamil Separatist activity that took place  in the past decades was because Sri Lanka did not agree to the implementation of the Bandaranaike­ Chelvanayakam Pact. The B-C pact was a golden opportunity to resolve the  Tamil problem through a  political  settlement based on power sharing, but  it never  got off the ground [22] because of political opposition in the South,  said Tamil analysts.

One month after the BC Pact was aborted the 1958 Sinhala Tamil riots started. [23] The  killing started at Gal Oya and spread from there. ITAK supporters who  were returning to Batticaloa by train were stopped and assaulted, on 25 May 1958, Jaffna bound train from Colombo was derailed.  The Hindu priest at Kandasamy kovil in Panadura was dragged out,   petrol was  poured over him and he was burnt. No one in the large crowd watching dared intervene.

The 1958 riots are presented as riots without any provocation, indicating a senseless hatred of  Tamils on the part of the Sinhalese.  This essay shows that there was plenty of  provocation.   ITAK showed open hostility to the MEP government from 1956 onwards.

 ITAK  strenuously objected to Sinhala Only and Sinhala colonization of the north, two  sensitive issues  of the Sinhalese.  The BC Pact and Anti Sri would have  added to  this situation.  Also, I am personally aware that  in the 1950s there was  much  pent up resentment about the privileged position enjoyed  by the Tamils during British rule. That may also have contributed.  Whether  all this justifies killing is another matter.

 To conclude, the B-C Pact was just one of the many significant activities going on the country at the time, said analysts. The period between July 1957 and April 1958, which was the duration of this unfortunate Pact also saw some very important achievements. The Trincomalee harbor and subsequently the Katunayake Air Base were taken over from the British. The all-important Paddy Lands Bill was passed, and followed by the Guaranteed price for paddy.

A University Commission was set up chaired by Needham and the Kandyan Peasantry Commission report was to be implemented. Sinhala was introduced as the medium of instruction for Advanced level, and the second Medical Faculty at Peradeniya was mooted. A National Provident Fund Bill was presented, amendments to the Workmens Compensation Act, and provisions made for public servants to speak out in the public interest. In addition to all this, this period saw a major flood of epic proportions in December1957 and January 1958, prior to which there was a spate of industrial strikes, notably those at the Port and the Railway.  

APPENDIX.

Bandaranaike – Chelvanayakam Pact, July 1957

Part A

 Representatives of the Federal Party had a series of discussions with the Prime Minister in an effort to resolve the differences of opinion that had been growing and creating tension

. At the early stages of these conversations it became evident that it was not possible for the Prime Minister to accede to some of the demands of the Federal Party.

 The Prime Minister stated that, from the point of view of the Government, he was not in a position to discuss the setting up of a Federal Constitution, or regional autonomy or any step which would abrogate the Official Language Act.

 The question then arose whether it was possible to explore the possibility of an adjustment without the Federal Party abandoning or surrendering any of its fundamental principles or objectives.

At this stage the Prime Minister suggested an examination of the government’s Draft Regional Council Bill to see whether provisions can be made under it to meet, reasonably, some of the matters in this regard which the Federal Party had in view.

The agreements so reached are embodied in a separate document.

Regarding the language the Federal Party reiterated its stand for parity but in view of the position of the Prime Minister in this matter they came to an agreement by way of an adjustment. They pointed out that it was important for them that there would be recognition of Tamil as a national language and that the administrative work in of the Northern and the Eastern Provinces should be done in Tamil.

The Prime Minister stated that as mentioned by him earlier it was not possible for him to take any steps that would abrogate the Official Language Act.

Use of Tamil; After discussions it was agreed that the proposed legislation should contain recognition of Tamil as the language of a national minority of Ceylon and that the four points mentioned by Prime Minister should include provision that, without infringing on the position of the Official Language as such, the language of administration of the Northern And Eastern Provinces be Tamil, and any necessary provision be made for non-Tamil speaking minorities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Regarding the question of Ceylon citizenship for the people of Indian descent and the Citizenship Act, the representatives of the Federal Party forwarded their views to the Prime Minister and pressed for an early settlement.

The Prime Minister indicated that this problem would receive early consideration.

 In view of these conclusions the Federal Party stated that they were withdrawing their proposed satyagraha.

Part B

1. Regional areas to be defined in the Bill itself by embodying them in the Schedule thereto.

2. That the Northern Province is to form one regional area whilst the Eastern Province is to be divided into one or more regional areas.

3. Provision is to be made in the Bill to enable two or more regions to amalgamate even beyond provincial limit; and for one region to divide itself subject to ratification by Parliament. Further provision is to be made in the Bill for two or more regions to collaborate for specific purposes of common interests

DIRECT ELECTIONS

4. Provision is to be made for the direct election of Regional councillors. Provision is to be made for a delimitation commission or commissions for carving out electorates. The question of MPs representing districts falling within regional areas to be eligible to function as chairman is to be considered. The question of Government Agents being Regional Commissioners is to be considered. The question of supervisory functions over larger towns, strategic towns and municipalities is to be looked into.

 SPECIAL POWERS

 5. Parliament is to delegate powers and specify them in the Act. It was agreed that regional councils should have powers over specified subjects including agriculture, cooperatives, lands and land developments, colonization, education, health, industries, fisheries, housing, social services, electricity, water schemes and roads. Requisite definition of powers be made in the Bill

COLONISATION SCHEMES

 6. It was agreed that in the matter of colonization schemes the powers of the regional councils shall include the powers to select allottees to whom land within their area of authority shall be alienated and also power to select personnel to be employed for work on such schemes. The position regarding the area at present administered by the Gal Oya Board in this matter requires consideration.

TAXATION AND BORROWING

 7. The powers in regard to the Regional councils vested in the Minister of Local Government in the draft bill to be revised with a view to vesting control in Parliament wherever necessary. 8. The Central Government will provide block grants to the regional councils. The principles on which the grants will be computed will be gone into. The regional councils shall have powers of taxation and borrowing

8. The Central Government will provide block grants to the regional councils. The principles on which the grants will be computed will be gone into. The regional councils shall have powers of taxation and borrowing[24]   END. ( continued)

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[1] https://www.dailymirror.lk/dbs-jeyaraj-column/The-abortive-Banda-Chelva-pact-of/192-108546

[2] https://www.dailymirror.lk/dbs-jeyaraj-column/The-abortive-Banda-Chelva-pact-of/192-108546

[3] https://www.dailymirror.lk/dbs-jeyaraj-column/The-abortive-Banda-Chelva-pact-of/192-108546

[4] https://www.dailymirror.lk/dbs-jeyaraj-column/The-abortive-Banda-Chelva-pact-of/192-108546

[5] https://www.dailymirror.lk/dbs-jeyaraj-column/The-abortive-Banda-Chelva-pact-of/192-108546

[6] https://www.dailymirror.lk/dbs-jeyaraj-column/The-abortive-Banda-Chelva-pact-of/192-108546

[7]  Ceylon Daily News. 12.8.1957 p 7

[8] Ceylon Daily News 19.8.57 p 1,3

[9] https://www.cpalanka.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/8/mark_Agreements_in_Sri_Lanka.pdf

[10] Ceylon Daily News 19.8.57 p 1,3

[11]  Ceylon Daily News 3.10.57 p I

[12] Ceylon Daily News 16.4.58 p 1, 3

[13] Ceylon Daily News 19.8. 57 p 1,3

[14]  Ceylon Daily News 12.8.57 p 7,12

[15] Ceylon Daily News 14.8.57 p 1

[16]   Ceylon Daily News 12.8.57 p 5

[17] Ceylon Daily news 10.4. 58

[18] https://www.cpalanka.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/8/mark_Agreements_in_Sri_Lanka.pdf

[19]  Ceylon Daily News 16.4. 58 p.3

[20] https://www.cpalanka.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/8/mark_Agreements_in_Sri_Lanka.pdf

[21] https://www.dailymirror.lk/dbs-jeyaraj-column/The-abortive-Banda-Chelva-pact-of/192-108546

[22] https://www.dailymirror.lk/dbs-jeyaraj-column/The-abortive-Banda-Chelva-pact-of/192-108546

[23] https://www.dailymirror.lk/dbs-jeyaraj-column/The-abortive-Banda-Chelva-pact-of/192-108546

[24] https://eelamhouse.com/docs/history-docs/Banda-Chelva-Pact-1957.pdf