Dr Jay Weerawardena

For want of a nail, the shoe was lost.
For want of the shoe, the horse was lost.
For want of the horse, the rider was lost.
For want of the rider, the battle was lost.
For want of the battle, the kingdom was lost.
And all for the want of a nail!!

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ In some respects, this old English nursery rhyme forces us to reflect on what led to the ethnic problem and the way forward beyond the recent military victory over ruthless LTTE terrorism. It also pinpoints the lost opportunities we had over the last four decades to solve the ethnic problem.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ The military victory and the public debate

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Although the jubilant military victory celebrations were cited in the Western media as a campaign humiliating the Tamils, it was a natural manifestation of the joy and relief of people from the LTTE terrorism that had engulfed the whole country over the last two decades. However, in the aftermath of the military victory, I am somewhat alarmed at the direction where the public debate is heading with regards to a possible solution for the ethnic problem. A few weeks ago, one writer to an English daily had taken this debate to an extreme end and cited that the need for a “a political solution to the ethnic problemƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ is ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”the most tired, tiresome and meaningless clichƒÆ’†’ƒ”š‚©sƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢. The crux of his view was that there has been no identifiable ethic problem and therefore there is no need for a political solution. This statement is not much different from the one that was aired during the height of the LTTE activities that ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”what we are having to day is a terrorist problem and not an ethnic problemƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢. The latter had some substance and relevance to the situation prevalent at that time and therefore was popular among a broader spectrum of people who had suffered enormously as a result of terrorism. Over the recent weeks, the word ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”devolutionƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ has come under attack, along with the All Party Conference process headed by Professor Tissa Vitharana, by the proponents of this view who broadly comprise of minor nationalist political groups. Interestingly, a substantial number of expatriates seem to contribute to the no-devolution view. Overall, this view reflects a total ignorance of the sufferings of the ordinary masses that bore the brunt of terrorism.ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚  It is a pity that the average villager in remote border villages whose loved ones were brutally massacred by the LTTE or those who suffered in the 1983 riots have no say in this debate.ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ 

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ The resurgence of the anti-devolution view can be obviously attributed to the military victory. It had its roots in the failure of the so-called peace pact of the Ranil Wickreamasinghe governmentƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚  brought about by theƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚  non-transparentƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚  peace negotiations and the lack of civil society participation in that peace process at that time. The subsequent Chandrika Kumaranatunga administrationƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s peace initiative paved the way for a group of intellectuals who advocated unconditional peace with the LTTE without assigning any role to the military. These intellectuals who were later branded and sidelined as ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”peace tradersƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ are silent today due to obvious reasons.

Military strategy as a part of the peace strategy

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Interestingly, those who under-value a devolution-oriented political solution argue that any attempt to devolve power will be an act of betrayal of the military victory achieved through the sacrifices of the armed forces. Whilst there is no doubt about the value of sacrifices made by our armed forces in their offensive against the LTTE, I think, two things need to be kept in mind about the military victory. Firstly, the military victory was achieved with a substantially high cost of human life. In fact, the jubilant masses were shocked with the details of casualties announced by the Defense Secretary just after the military victory. It was obvious that the whole country had paid a heavy price in militarily vanquishing the LTTE. The Sri Lankan Army lost nearly 24,000 personnel in its three-decade long conflict with the LTTE rebels, including over 6,200 deaths with 29,551 wounded in the final offensive. An important irony here is that if we are to avoid such a human cost in the future we must eliminate the root causes that led to terrorism. Secondly, those riding on the military victory fail to understand that the military initiative which was later turned to be an accelerated humanitarian offensive was undertaken to clear a major stumbling block for the peace process. During the latter stages of the peace process, despite the continued efforts of the Sri Lankan government it was obvious that the LTTE was not interested in a negotiated settlement.ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚  The point of no return for the government came when the LTTE closed the sluice gates of Mavil Aru anicut on July 21 2006 which led to an accelerated ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”humanitarian offensiveƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢. As we know the rest is history.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ On reflection, I would argue that the ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”peace processƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ became a well-articulated ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”peace strategyƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ with the governmentƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s decision to abrogate the peace pact and embark on a strategically planned military offensive with a view to weakening the military capability of LTTE. The government throughout the offensive reiterated its commitment to a negotiated settlement for the ethnic problem. Therefore it must be understood that the military offensive was only a strategic step in the overall ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”peace strategyƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ and not the ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”primary strategyƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ for achieving a lasting solution to the problem. Those attempting to discourage a devolution-based political solution whilst riding on the military victory fail to capture the full picture. In strategic terms, they see only the ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”treesƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ but not the ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”jungleƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢.

I invite those advocating the view that there has not been an ethnic problem to reflect on how the LTTE was able to mobilize the Tamil community to build the most ruthless and formidable terrorist group in the world with their cadres willing to sacrifice their lives for a separate state. They must also reflect on numerous negotiations and pacts the successive governments of Sri Lanka entered into with Tamil leaders since 1956. The nursery rhyme I cited at the beginning of this article ideally captures the several lost opportunities at the very early stages of the problem which would have nipped it in the bud!!

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ On a positive note, today, the average Sri Lankan is more mature politically and a devolution-based political solution is more appealing to them than two decades ago. They are of the consensus that two decades of violent history should not be allowed to repeat itself. They have been patiently supporting their leaders, particularly the current government and the leadership, whilst making substantial sacrifices. Similarly, the government on several occasions before and after the military victory has reiterated its firm commitment to a political solution. Over the recent weeks in response to international and local pressure to clarify the governmentƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s position on the intended political solution President Mahinda Rajapakse has reiterated that the government will embark on a devolution-based solution. Current speculation is that the government will go beyond power devolution through the 13^th amendment and embark on constitutional reforms. Over the recent weeks President Rajapakse has also cautioned some factions within the government not to hinder the government aspirations. The JVP whilst claiming that it was instrumental in pushing the government towards a military offensive, by vehemently opposing the 13^th amendment-based power sharing has displayed its immaturity and continued ignorance of the gravity of the ethnic problem and their irrelevance to the future of this country.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ My aim in this article is to urge everyone contributing to the debate to sincerely reflect on the views expressed above and support the government to concentrate on the task of achieving a lasting peace, to ensure that a tragedy of this magnitude which ruined our economic and social development over the last two decades would never see the light of day again. Whilst the need for a political solution is a necessity, I would argue that several other initiatives which are equally important need to be undertaken.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ A needs-based approach

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Is the political solution the only priority at this stage? The current debate implies so. The current emphasis also suggests that everyone affected by the war are a homogeneous group of people. In general, one can argue that the root cause for the armed conflict was the frustration among Tamils that a solution for their grievances could not be achieved through the Sinhalese dominated central government. However, the affected parties comprise people with different aspirations and socio economic backgrounds. They include average Tamil families who, like any other family living in the South wish to raise their children in a reasonably comfortable environment; the Sinhala and Muslim people who were living in border villages who always sought to live with Tamils in harmony; the Tamil youth who looked for better economic opportunities; the LTTE cadres who strongly believed that a separate state will be the only solution for their grievances and the moderate Tamil politicians who believe that a political solution that will address the grievances of the Tamils can be achieved by working with the government.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ I would argue that, whilst a political solution based on power sharing will be a priority for the last two groups mentioned, the others who have undergone enormous economic and social hardships due to the conflict over the last two decades form the majority. The life of ordinary Tamils was not only disturbed by the war over a substantial period of time, but also they were forced to go with the retreating LTTE forces carrying their belongings. Towards the end, when they were running away defying the LTTE death threats, their belongings had been reduced to a small bag in many instances. They are now in IDP camps dreaming to get back to their normal life. Looking after their needs and settling them should be high on the governmentƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s agenda.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ A multi pronged strategy

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Obviously, the peace strategy has arrived at a stage where a multi pronged strategy is needed. With the elimination of LTTE de-facto military administration in the Vanni region the government has to re-establish law and order and strengthen the civil administration. It is clear that the government is moving fast in these two strategic areas which are prerequisites for a lasting solution. Irrespective of the nature of the political solution, for it to be implemented, the said two areas need to be strengthened.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ At the same time, the government needs to send clear signals on its plan for a political solution. As indicated by President Mahinda Rajapakse in an interview with an Indian journalist last year, all those who aspire a political solution must understand the ground realities: ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ…-it is not like making instant coffee. Ultimately, it would be a mistake for Western governments to allow their frustrations with the slow pace of (political) reform in Sri Lanka to be interpreted as empathy with a terrorist cause.ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”š‚ He stressed the importance of taking the people along with him towards a successful solution. He said, ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ…-In any peace settlement I have to carry the Sinhala voters with me. I cannot unilaterally impose a settlement – it has to be the outcome of a political process – an outcome that must be long-lasting and acceptable to the people.ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”š‚ Those who understand these ground realities will definitely be patient. However, what is strategically important at this stage is to effectively communicate the Sri Lankan GovernmentƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s commitment to a political solution and the ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”road mapƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ to achieve this objective to the two internal stakeholders mentioned above and the Western nations who are seeking an early political solution. At the same time, similar to the strong determination that the Sri Lankan government displayed in the military offensive, I believe that the government is determined to overcome the current obstacles in particular those of the minority groups currently riding on a no-devolution campaign. A devolution-based political solution is one critical phase in the peace strategy which is too important to be controlled by minority groups who fail to understand the historical stage we have arrived at in the peace process.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Reconciliation through economic activity

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ It is a fact that the unfortunate political events of the post-independent years led to a substantial mistrust and hatred between the Sinhala and Tamil communities which in the 1940s fought shoulder-to-shoulder against the British for independence. As we know the LTTE campaign intensified this division. The urgent need at this stage is to launch a well-coordinated program of activities to heal the wounds caused by the conflict. Experiences from the past conflict reconciliation efforts suggests that economic reawakening is vital for reconciliation of hostilities. Lessons from recent hotbeds of ethnic conflicts such as Darfur and Rwanda suggest that increased economic activity can accelerate the healing of wounds of ethnic hatred (Boudreaux, 2007). For example the violence in Darfur drove farmers out of the areas and into refugee camps. However without the farmers, the herders had limited trading opportunities. The result was that herders were eager for their former farmer friends to return to their fields. Similarly in Rwanda where the coffee industry was the major livelihood, coffee producers were both the victims and killers.ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚  Whilst the killers were later imprisoned their wives and children opted to work with victims to earn their livelihood. These experiences suggest that trade and commercial activities should be seen as cost-effective compliments to government efforts to foster reconciliation. Those advocating this view emphasize the need to nurture and build local entrepreneurship. ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”People in post conflict environments need jobs. Only if they have jobs they can take care of their own problems and become stable citizens, less likely to resort back to violenceƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ (Boudreaux, 2007).

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Based on the aforementioned experiences the government must take steps to promote trade in the relevant areas. The ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”Northern SpringƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ rehabilitation program that has been recently launched by the government under which an accelerated infrastructure development has been undertaken is already showing results. Similarly, removal of restrictions for fishing and internal air travel will have a substantial economic impact. Reopening of the A9 main road and the re-establishment of the Yal Devi train service and possible opening of Economic Centers similar to those in the South will be some of the key steps in this direction. However, as the past experiences in the 1970s suggest, instead of government agencies engaging in trade which always lead to inefficiencies, the government must promote private sector initiatives. Rural entrepreneurship particularly among the youth should be identified and nurtured. If every young one has a hope for the future in his/her heart and a flashy mobile phone in hand why would he/she take arms against the authorities?

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ We need good communicators

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ Communication has been the GovernmentƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”Achilles heelƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ – the most vulnerable spot ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…” in its campaign against the LTTE. It is well known that in spite of everything it did within its means to take care of Tamil civilians in its military offensive, it failed to counter the strong campaigns in USA and Europe which accused the government of genocide. The government needs good communicators wherever it matters. Most importantly, the overseas missions must have effective communicators. When it comes to reconciliation and a political solution the government needs to communicate its good intentions. This needs to be undertaken in a strategic and professional manner. The same message and the media vehicle through which it is communicated will not be effective in reaching multiple parties mentioned above. It has to be tailored to suit the right audience. Most importantly, will the average Tamil families understand the way the political solution will be communicated? We will need barefoot communicators similar to field officers who were deployed in introducing the ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”JanasaviyaƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ campaign some years ago ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…” may be in a much larger scale.

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ The way forward

ƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚ I think the two primary strategic areas cited above will be the most important in the governmentƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s peace strategy. We are not in a ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”peace processƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ any more. As argued above, the Sri Lankan government decided to take a firmer control of the ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”peace processƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ to embark on a ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”peace strategyƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ when it decided to eliminate a major obstacle to solveƒÆ’-¡ƒ”š‚  the ethnic problem ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…” a solution acceptable to the majority. Effective communication with all the stakeholders will be critically important in strategically navigating in the two strategic areas discussed above.