R Chandrasoma

India will gain the most if it can make Sri Lanka a ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”client stateƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ and thus treat the Island Nation as a protege that will always act in ways favourable to its larger and more powerful neighbor. This strategy of imposed subservience will be stoutly resisted by Sri Lanka as it is patently a bad deal in in terms of trade and foreign policyƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…” leaving aside the affront to its dignity as an ancient and independent nation. It is clear that such a policy if pursued by India will not only result in failure but can have the very opposite effect of making Sri Lanka an unfriendly neighbour in the same class as Pakistan. This scenario is, surely, well known and anticipated by strategists in India and there is no chance that it will ever come to pass.

The challenge, then, for our powerful neighbor is to device a policy that will yield results that maximize the hegemonic overlordship of India while minimizing the chance of a backlash from Sri Lanka that will make the overall position worse than what it was before. If we see the move and countermove of the two neighbourly nations as a ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”gameƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ then the ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”minimax principleƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ in zero-sum contests is the secure foundation for the best outcome. Suppose we adopt this minimax approach in the political ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”conflictƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ outlined above. Each side asks – ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”what is the best move I can make such that the best counterƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…”move of my opponent causes least damage to me? Here there is a weighing of each move in terms of the range of possible counter-moves and selecting that which is advantageous overall given that the ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”enemyƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ is also a strategist. Take the ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”fishing problemƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ between India and Sri Lanka ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…” not an explosive issue to India as a whole but paradigmatic of the difficulties involved. The Indian strategist – mindful of IndiiaƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s naval superiority – will do his utmost to extend maritime fishing rights across the boundary demarcating the territorial waters of the two countries. This will be thwarted by Sri Lanka naval power in the North and East of the Island. The Indians ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…” using the minmax principle ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…” have resorted to a strategy of not intercepting their fishing fleet when it strays across the border ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…” turning a blind eye to defalcations on their side – while being vigilant about incursions into Indian territorial waters by Sri Lankan vessels. This craftiness has the best payoff given that an open display of power will trigger an unwelcome – and even dangerous – retaliation.

A far more important issue is the position of India in the standoff between Sri Lanka and the major Western Powers on the issue of human rights in defensive wars against indigenous terrorists. For India, the issue is not about ethics and the moral law in bloody conflicts ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…” it is a strategic problem involving the balance of advantage and disadvantage in backing the Western initiative or supporting Sri Lanka. Unlike the Fishing Rights Problem, this affair involving Tamil Terrorism and its aftermath is formidably difficult to resolve by straightforward cost-benefit analysis. The minmax principle must be invoked in this case too but the ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”winning strategyƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ is difficult to pin down because the repercussions are uncertain. Suppose India backs the move to denounce Sri Lanka ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…” it is clear that there are very substantial payoffs. These include the soothing of the separatist passions in South India, winning the favour of the Western Block that is now IndiaƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s friend and trading partner and last (but not least) cocking a snook at IndiaƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢s great challenger ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…”China. The growing friendship between China and Sri Lanka is seen in a very bad light by Indian strategists.

Let us look at the negative reactions to a pro-Western stance on this matter. Far from assuaging separatist passions in the South, this move will be seen as a spur to increased agitation by the separatists of the region ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…” indeed, such a move will weaken the integrity of the Indian Union. The nakedly pro-Western stance will diminish the standing of India in the community of non-aligned nations and will be exposed to the charge of hypocrisy in that it has not hesitated to violate ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”human rightsƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ in such subject states as Kashmir. Above all, there is a fair chance that Sri Lanka will henceforth treat India as a long-term threat to the stability and integrity of their country. The ancient centres of destabilization in the Chola and Pandyan regions of Soth India will come alive after centuries of dormance ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…” a dismal prospect for Sri Lanka. There is a ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ”¹…”tertium quidƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢-¾‚¢ ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…” abstention from voting ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…” but this will offend all parties and is unlikely.

Let us not anticipate what India will do given this dangerously poised balance of options. Clearly, the minimax route to discision-making is forced on its strategic planners. However, there is no obvious best course of action given that all actions will have negative sequala which must be estimated ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…” as noted above, political decision making is a form of statistical estimation with moral principles playing no more than a decorative role. Overall, then, the action taken will be that which is maximally benefial to India and has the least damaging backlash from Sri Lanka. We have merely stated the principle ƒÆ’‚¢ƒ¢-¡‚¬ƒ¢¢”š¬…” the practical details are for the leading actors in this complex drama.