Even though within months of coming to power, the Senanayake government expelled a Russian diplomat for allegedly meddling in the elections in 1965, Prof. Levin says he has found no evidence of Soviet meddling in 1965 or any of the Sri Lankan elections he studied.
Colombo expelled Mr. Khairoullam Shalkarov second secretary of the Russian Embassy in Colombo in July 1965 saying he was a Soviet intelligence agent who
once operated as a Soviet military adviser in Laos under the alias “Colonel Khakunov” and that he had interfered on behalf of the Soviet Union in the elections that year.
Coming as it did at the height of the Cold War, American media didn’t fail to seizeupon the Soviet diplomat’s expulsion and the allegations of meddling.
Leon Dennen, a special correspondent for the Newspaper Enterprise Association, a syndicate serving news outlets throughout the nation, wrote in
a column published July 22, 1965:
Colombo’s press added the information that Shalkarov interfered on behalf of the Reds in Ceylon’s recent elections. If this information is true, Shalkarov
(or whatever his real nam e) is an ineffective as well as an unskillful agent. Ceylon’s elections finally brought about the fall of the entrenched pro-Red regime
and its replacement by the pro- American national government of Premier Dudley Senanayake.”
While there’s no evidence to back up the allegations of Russian interference, the UNP’s own acceptance of US/CIA covert aid in the 1965 elections has been documented by no less a source than a top US diplomat.
According to the late Robert Keeley who served in the US foreign service for 34 years, serving as ambassador Greece and several countries, the US intervention in Sri Lanka in 1965 installing the UNP in power was held up as an example of the likelihood of success by embassy staff in Athens as they discussed proposals for a possible massive intervention in Greece’s elections in 1967. Keeley was the only dissenter to the proposed scheme, allegedly worked out by the CIA, to support conservative candidates, principally with money, to prevent the Center Union from winning. “One argument cited in support of this scheme was the great success such an intervention had achieved in Ceylon in 1965, where a conservative party had been assisted in order to defeat and drive from power the allegedly extreme leftist Bandaranaike party,” Keeley writes in his book The Colonel’s Coup and the American Embassy: A Diplomat’s View of the Breakdown of Democracy in Cold War Greece. However, Washington turned down the proposal and Keeley remarks in the book: “Perhaps someone in Washington was prescient as to what the ultimate effect of a similar intervention in Greece might be: in 1970 the Bandaranaike party won an overwhelming victory in Ceylon, driving our clients from power most ignominiously.”
Prof. Levin said his research shows that electoral interventions in general can have a significant effect on the outcome, increasing the vote share of assisted candidate or party by about 3% on average. Secondly, public or overt electoral interventions are significantly more effective than covert interventions in helping the preferred side. Most interventions (two-thirds) historically have been covert.
While his data collection ends in 2000, Prof. Levin’s research is ongoing. Asked about interventions during the Obama administration, he thinks it is too early to tell how frequently the Obama administration tampered in foreign elections. However, he says he knows “for sure that the Obama administration intervened in at least three elections: in Lebanon in 2009, in Afghanistan in 2009, and in Kenya in 2013.
As for the question of USA interference in the 2015 elections in Sri Lanka, he prefers a cautious approach: Given how recent these events are, and from what information is publicly available so far, it is simply too early to tell in the case of the 2015 Sri Lankan election. Hopefully new information will come out soon that will clarify things in this regard.”
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