Mawil Aru: Water or ethnic cleansing?

by Neville Ladduwahetty, Courtesy The Island 10-08-2006

One explanation offered by the LTTE for the Mawil aru episode was that it was their response to being designated a terrorist entity by the European Union (EU). This explanation only validates the EU decision, for only a terrorist entity would terrorise civilians for political purposes, as in this case, by denying water; one of the essentials for life. A subsequent explanation was that it was in protest for the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) not constructing a water tower to serve the needs of the civilians living in areas under LTTE control. What is bizarre is that on the one hand, the GOSL is expected to restore law and order by subduing a terrorist/separatist insurgency, while on the other, it is obligated to provide finances for essential services such as water, health, education with administrative arrangements to support all services to the civilian population living and serving the LTTE in areas claimed to be their de facto state. Both explanations cloak the real reason behind the move to deprive water, first in 1991 and now in 2006, to 60,000 civilians; which is, clearly the forced expulsion of the civilian population from the area.

Ethnic cleansing is the real motive for the LTTE’s actions. Ethnic cleansing was the intended consequence in the denial of a basic need for human survival. The LTTE’s action must be viewed from the twin benefits to them of the altered demographics: first, its impact on the future political solution, and second, regaining their lost control of the Eastern Province, a control essential for influencing this political solution.

Control of the region north of the Verugal River and south of Trincomalee is critical, as evidenced by the second attack on the troop ship. For the GOSL, securing this region can assure security to the Trincomalee harbour and its environs. This is why it was essential for the GOSL to retain control of Muttur. With two attempts on the troop ships already, the LTTE is bound to make further attempts to gain control of Muttur for the town’s strategic importance. Therefore, every effort must be made by the GOSL to ensure that the control of this vital area is durable.

The fact that the Mawil Aru area was secured by the GOSL and then abandoned shows a lack of appreciation of how critical this region in particular, and the Eastern Province as a whole, is to the inviolability of the integrity of the state. The political leadership of successive governments has failed to recognise this importance. Likewise, the Security establishment has failed to convince their political masters of this vital aspect. As a result the GOSL has lost its writ over parts of the province since 1994.

Military and political issues are intrinsically intertwined. Political power and influence is the ultimate goal of any military operation. Military campaigns are only the means to secure and control regions that garner maximum political power. From a military perspective, establishing the writ of the state in the Eastern Province is relatively less hazardous than doing so in the Northern Province. At the same time, it is the Eastern Province that is the linchpin to the political solution.

While the military and the political establishments recognise the importance of the Eastern Province from their respective perspectives, they do not appear to see the interdependence of their interests in the province. Had they done so, the Eastern Province would not have been abandoned after it was secured in 1994 in favour of pursuing other more ambitious military operations, but with lesser political rewards.

Continued attempts by the LTTE to ethnically cleanse the Eastern Province as they had done in the Northern Province by the expulsion of 70,000 Muslims, reflect the LTTE’s recognition of the strategic importance of the Eastern Province. Without it Tamil nationalism is surreal. The limits to which the LTTE is prepared to go in order to consolidate the Eastern Province as part of Tamil Eelam is seen in their intention to make Continued attempts by the LTTE to ethnically cleanse the Eastern Province as they had done in the Northern Province by the expulsion of 70,000 Muslims, reflect the LTTE’s recognition of the strategic importance of the Eastern Province. Trincomalee the capital instead of Jaffna, the actual birthplace of Tamil nationalism. Had successive Sri Lankan governments recognised the full import of the Eastern Province to Tamil nationalism they would NOT have abandoned the Mawil aru after it was retaken following the sluice gates being blasted by the LTTE in 1991. This has allowed this region to come within the control of the LTTE.

Sri Lankan governments do acknowledge the importance of the Eastern Province in Sri Lanka’s religious and economic history. Revival of its economic potential was undertaken after independence primarily for agricultural economic benefits. Had economic revival been undertaken from a realisation of the province’s strategic importance to the territorial integrity of the country, the developmental trajectories would have been different. The indifference to its strategic and territorial implications is confirmed by the greater attention given to structural power sharing arrangements to resolve the national question rather than to size, composition and character of the units to which power is to be devolved. Consequently, the emphasis given to structural adjustments relating to power sharing rather than to territory as the determinant in the formulations of the national question has distorted its relative importance.

It has been suggested that the choice for Sri Lanka is to devolve or die. Devolution to a combined Northern and Eastern Province could, perhaps, amount to death from a long term security standpoint. On the other hand, devolving to two separate provinces may not lead to such a dire consequence. The crux of Sri Lanka’s national question is the Eastern Province and the debate is on devolution, but the degree of devolution is dependent on whether the unit of devolution is a merged Northern and Eastern Province or two separate provinces. This should be the focus of the debate, but as long as the territorial limit of devolution is kept off the debate, there would be no finality.

As far as the Tamil leadership was concerned the focus has always been on territory. The pacts made by Mr. Chelvanayakam with Prime Ministers, Bandaranaike and Senanayaka were about claiming the Eastern Province as a part of a Tamil majority region. Having failed to get recognition from successive Sri Lankan governments to a territorial claim bKased on the numeric Tamil majority in the Northern Province being creatively extended to the Eastern Province, the Tamil political leadership together with their fellow Tamils in Tamil Nadu brought pressure on the Indian Government to force a merger of the two provinces under the terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord.

However, both the Accord and Sri Lankan law require a referendum to be conducted in the Eastern Province. Therefore, the issue of territory is not yet closed. Fearing the outcome of a referendum or the current legal challenge to the validity of the merger, coupled with the loss of LTTE control in the Eastern Province brought about by the defection of Karuna, are clearly the underlying reasons for the LTTE’s latest resort to ethnic cleansing by shutting off water to 60,000 civilians.

The focus on territory is kept hidden behind the veil of the political debate on devolution. However, the International Community must acknowledge that in the final analysis, the resolution of Sri Lanka’s national question, as I have argued, hinges on the unit of devolution and a durable solution has to be founded on principles of territorial integrity, democracy, pluralism and human rights which are their own accepted norms, and not on whimsical claims of homelands and areas of traditional habitation all of which have no place in democratic political determinations.