Winds have changed

Dilrook Kannangara

I witnessed the mass exodus of civilians from terrorist controlled areas first hand. It was a disheartening sight to see mothers caring for their children in the pouring rain. They were disgusted and angry at both the government and the LTTE. Many openly criticised the government forces for shelling their areas in Tamil. I had the opportunity to ask one of the young men why the exodus moved towards government controlled areas and the answer was “it is better in terms of security, care and stability”. He believed that the tigers are fighting a losing battle. None of this is news to me or any Sri Lankan; we all know this.

But there emerge an important question. Why do people flee to government controlled areas? During operation Riviresa (1995), Balawegaya (1994), Jaya Sikuru (1997-8) and terror attacks on Jaffna in 2001 people in LTTE controlled areas didn’t move anywhere and those in government controlled areas adjacent to battle zones move to LTTE areas.

What has changed in 2006 from 1983-2005? The battleground was changed in 2006; forces are given clear directions as to what to achieve and were provided with necessary air and artillery support. Some (mostly local “analysts” and “peace” workers) try to compare our military strategy to that followed by Israel. Nevertheless we have been on top of the tigers this time around. Unwavering courage of the government and the forces personnel showed we can overcome any terror attack. Of course it is possible for the LTTE to go on a demolition spree in Colombo or elsewhere as they had adequate explosives and cadres in these places waiting their turn. However, it is the retaliatory attacks that the terrorists fear most. This has brought about equilibrium of power on both sides in the ability to attack each others economy.

However, terrorists are hell bent on taking Jaffna and Trinco for their utopian Elam state and hence attacked security forces to expel them. This marked the start of the LTTE’s epitaph in the East. We have all along struck to our policy of retaliation which has yielded tremendous results. (LTTE’s failure in terms of methods)

As reported in media recently the LTTE is desperate for international sympathy and the proxies are working overtime to resuscitate the dying tiger. (LTTE’s failure in terms of material)
Continued bombardment of terror ammunition dumps and arms shipments will accelerate the demise of the LTTE. (LTTE’s failure in terms of machines)
Last but not least they have lost a large number of men (rather children) and struggling to keep its recruitment drive.

In any management philosophy losses/failures in terms of men, materials, machines and methods lead to collapse. I attribute the mass exodus to this gradual collapse of the LTTE.

To make matters worse Anton Bala was taken away from them; human shields proved ineffective; best friends (Canada, EU, India) deserted them; people lost faith in them; and the main fighting brigade (Jeyanthan brigade) defected them.

However, the tiger is still alive and they have shown strong comebacks. Both its local servants - the UNP and the TNA – work so hard to keep the tigers alive. Supporting them are the “peace” humbugs, some NGOs, some human rights activists, some “journalists”, some “priests”, reservists and few other sundry cadres who do not have the people’s backing.

If we are to succeed in our battle we should take them on as well; the timely reintroduction of the PTA should be put to good use to cripple these elements. As in 1995 when Jaffna was taken, there will be mourners for the LTTE’s downfall. Some of these so called “moderates” will display their true colours and stripes when Wakarei falls. Another disturbing development is the terror links of Tamil Nadu. Although the Indian central government will not bow down to terror, things can become complicated. A continued assault on the LTTE will wipe terror out of our nation for good.