WHY THE MOU WILL NOT DELIVER THE GOODS

Dilrook Kannangara

The MoU between the SLFP and UNP is a tie-up between two political parties that once held similar aspirations. At the moment these two parties have widely disparate views on national unity, territorial integrity and terrorism. The SLFP believes in preserving the territorial integrity, unitary status and sovereignty of the nation whereas the UNP aspires to create a federal/quasi federal or disintegrated nation/s. They have not made it clear for the past 17 years (the last attempt to strike a political deal ended in disaster in 1989) what the political solution they would adopt to solve the North-East conflict.

It is interesting to note that there were seven (7) different administrations during these past 17 years. All but three (3) (administrations) during the time put forward their proposals for a political solution. It was the Premadasa (88-93), Wijetunge (93-94) administrations and Chandrika/Ranil (2001-2004) administration that failed to come up with any published proposals. Also important to note is the de-facto status of the nation during these periods and the complete inaction of these governments towards it.
It is clear that these three governments were pursuing a strategy of disintegration than decentralisation. Some may argue that only disintegration is sought by the LTTE and hence if a political solution to be acceptable to the LTTE, it should be based on disintegration than decentralisation.

Also consider the following.
dealings the UNP and their members had with the LTTE
their election promise of handing over the N-E for 2 years to a separate administration by the LTTE
agreements (written and implicit) made with the LTTE
continued avoidance of condemnation of terror attacks
use of UNP media clout to the detriment of the armed forces
violation of the constitution, the PTA and a some provisions of the Public Security Ordinance in signing the MoU with the LTTE
allowing terrorists unrestricted passage to all parts of the country
dismantling of military infrastructure and divisions (Manirasakulam/Sampur, Long Range Unit of the Sri Lanka military, non-replenishment of military consumables in 2003)
mishandling of the worst riots after 1983 that occurred in Valachchenei in 2002 in favour of the LTTE
passive inaction towards LTTE’s ethnic cleansing activities
UNP’s continued shift away from the social, ethical and national values towards an indifferent approach to these
Appeasement of the LTTE, its political agents, connected NGOs and other organisations sympathetic towards it.
High importance the UNP gives to the 17th amendment that does not in any way benefit the people or the nation.

The MoU between the SLFP and the UNP will become like another round of GOSL-LTTE peace talks. Everyone appreciates it but does not meet the expectations of the people. It fails to recognise the different contemporary political aspirations of the two parties, their voters and members. Also it avoids agreement on the most crucial issue: terrorism. Mere statement of co-operation towards dealing with terrorism does not suffice as these two parties have different definitions of terrorism (SLFP sees it as a threat whereas the UNP considers it an opportunity – e.g. there’s no doubt that the 2001 airport attack and 9/11 attacks were used by these two parties in different ways).

In my view the UNP will never divorce from their marriage with the LTTE for the following reasons.
Media backing it receives from pro-LTTE media both in Sri Lanka and abroad
(Fact – all popular Tamil media in Sri Lanka and the BBC and others backs the LTTE and its allies)
Strong misconception among a vast population of Tamils that LTTE is fighting a liberation/resistance struggle on behalf of them hence attracting Tamil votes for those connected to the LTTE
(Fact - UNP securing Tamil majority electorates in spite of nation-wide losses)
Naïve act of seeking security from the LTTE against assassinations and other disruptions to political activity
(Fact – no LTTE threat/attempt was made on UNP politicians’ lives and property for the last 12 years)
Concert with the LTTE to cause damage to other political parties by way of assassinations, terrorising political activists, election violence and pre-election attacks.
(Fact – lead up to the 1999 and 2005 presidential elections, 2000, 2001 and 2004 general elections were marred by LTTE terror and significant post-election violence)
Attack of economic targets with a view to disrupt economic activates while the SLFP coalitions are in power.
(Fact – all LTTE attacks on economic centres were made during non-UNP regimes in the last 19 years)
Looking up to the LTTE to provide a strong leadership and political direction for the politically and ideologically barren UNP
(Fact – On the political front, appointing cabinets of ministers in 1989 and 2001 with the intent of pleasing the LTTE. On an ideological front, the UNP supports the merger of N-E provinces, prefers disintegration to decentralisation)

“Southern concessus essential for the success of peace talks/peace deals” as referred to by the LTTE is meant to denote a strong pro-LTTE arrangement in the “south” so that the terrorists could have a free-go in getting their demands. Naturally, the terrorists’ expectation (same as that of the UNP) is a pro-LTTE arrangement in the “south”. This is an unlikely outcome of the SLFP-UNP MoU. So the cycle of terror continues.