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REBELS 2007: IMPACT

By Gomin Dayasri

Who benefits from the crossing of the opposition MP's to the Government? Obviously, themselves but the political ramifications it has set in motion will reverberate in the coming years. They have disarranged and disturbed the political scene to an extent that the added numerical strength to the government could turn to straw if events overtake the mathematical calculations

Impact on the UNP:

The desertions from the UNP has an immediate psychological impact on the electorate portraying it as a defeated party still bickering to defeat itself more, distanced from the people, unlikely to be on the comeback trail. For the floating and detached voter to rally around the UNP may be considered an exercise in futility. The growth of the party would be stunted. The lack of confidence in the leadership by the party; the lack of confidence in the party by the electorate would result in further erosions.

Many of the rebels were so positioned in the party they could not remain; yet the party is so convoluted they are still prepared to reclaim them. Incredible, but the trumpet call is for the rouge elephants to return to the fold- so extinct is the tribe.

Their departure makes Ranil Wickremasinghe more secure in his position as the leader, the remaining rump are his own faithful whose prominence in the party hierarchy is dependent on his survival. It is a reciprocal arrangement bringing contentment to Wickremasinghe and his cahoots- while reconfirming him as the leader to lead to another defeat.

This will bring joy to President Rajapakse as Ranil Wickremasinghe is a dream opponent- unable to take off from his starting block in a Presidential race. President will forever manipulate to retain Ranil Wickremasinghe as the leader of the opposition to face friendly fire which often ricochets in the face of the firer. Both the PA and the UNP has a common denominator, to calculate that the mantle does not fall on the JVP.

Previously when party stalwarts like Gamini Dissanayake and Lalith Athulathmudali left the UNP they had the courage and the strength to form a formidable third force (DUNF) to present a credible alternative to President Premadasa as a more elegant refined rational UNP outfit. The difference was unlike the rebels of today - they had skill capacity and age ahead of them - to face the country on their own steam and bide their time. The present rebels are more in search of instant power and easy perquisites and walked into the arms of the enemy to enjoy a better tomorrow for themselves. They are likely to make the SLFP their permanent comfort home for the aged, in fact, leaving many SLFP loyalists homeless- genesis for a fresh crisis.

If the LTTE voted for Ranil Wickremasinghe to make him the President with the rebels securely entrenched as Cabinet Ministers would they have walked out on the UNP?

Unlike the previous deserters their return to the UNP fold is less probable- with their places usurped by the remaining faithful and probably being of sparse value (except maybe for Karu Jayasuriya, Hemakumar Nanayakkara and Mano Wijeratne) the UNP may have involuntarily cleansed themselves of driftwood while the SLFP attracted plenty garbage. The created vacancies may be a lifeline to the UNP to attract more presentable and untainted candidates. However with Ranil Wickremasinghe most probably, candidates more like himself will be selected.

To many of its core supporters, UNP is a way of life notwithstanding the leader being a captive of an entrenched Colombo based Montessori grade professional/business mafia. Unlike the rebels, they will not desert a sinking ship for silver. The exodus does not percolate to the roots but to the coterie around the departing beneficiaries. In fact some are frequent fliers between parties.

It is an oversimplification to place the blame totally on the leader -it is more the policies that led the UNP astray; for which the rebels are equally culpable. The electoral alliances with the SLMC and the CWC, with a strong tilt to the LTTE and inputs from Business Community, determined UNP policies to lead to serial defeats; knowing well the SLMC and CWC are floating minorities ready to swing with a change of fortunes which the UNP neglected to consider.. It was a counter to SLFP links with the JVP and JHU which is a bonus at election time. For the UNP to revamp its policies is a possible engineering feat than jettisoning the leader, in the absence of another. New leader, new policy is a forerunner for a change in fortune. Ranil and his Rat Pack with their tiny tot minds are incapable of altering policies.

UNP bases are the best funded and it has the potential to attract fresh young talent more than any other party due the prevailing hiatus with the rebels departing. Chances are that more mini- Ranils will enter. An opportunity has dawned to a party with a history of lost opportunities.

The minority parties moving to the government after the election is a greater loss than the defection of the rebels.

Impact on the SLFP:

President Rajapakse unlike his counterpart is streets ahead of his Party. His conduct of the war has made his popularity soar and he can win without the JVP and JHU at a Presidential election. Yet the SLFP could be under a severe threat at a Parliamentary election which could be before a Presidential election. President's own popularity can get fatally dented if the political slut is not contained.

In search of numbers in Parliament he opted to co-opt the rebels from the UNP in a high risk gamble that has triggered a chain of events. The intake drove away the JVP from any future alliance which guarantees a triangular contest at future elections to which the SLFP is vulnerable in a difficult economy. To replace the JVP with the UNP dissidents in making the parliamentary election nomination list is possible but with an appreciable loss in the vote bank. The rebels will be a liability as they will endanger the floating detached vote rather than gain substantial UNP votes and unlike the JVP does not possess a streamlined campaign machine. The rebels are in no condition to face an early election unlike the President and at an election most will have to be hidden than displayed. Lesser aggregate vote means lesser numbers in parliament for the SLFP which leads to a Parliament still more hung.

Accommodation of any post election crossovers is at the expense of the reigning party faithful and disenchantment is inevitable. Trend has been set with ministerial rewards in crossing the divide, and if, more from the provinces make the voyage the disenchantment will be infectious after each prize giving. Sharing the spoils with the enemy at ground level can have disastrous effects as gravy train cannot run endlessly.

With its inherent inferiority complex SLFP has always treated comings from the UNP as gifts from the gods. Internal party dissension within the SLFP normally accrues to the benefit of the UNP with the movement in that direction but no more; swing would be more towards the JVP with voters of the SLFP/JVP at the past two elections aligning together to oust the UNP and the bondage so established is easily renewable. More so JVP will become the main demolition squad in the opposition.The swing to the UNP from the SLFP -the historic foe- did take place in times of despair but with UNP in disarray, the float is more probable to the JVP with its patriotic soundings. Yet the President has a plank none can match for the moment-success at the War-which is proved patriotism. Wickremasinghe is in the gallows with the noose around his neck and with his feet dangling with no plank to stand.

If the elements of good governance is not operational and the cost of living keeps soaring much of the blame will be placed on the rebels in the jumbo cabinet especially as their previous performance in ministerial posts has been dismal. With the rebels competing for patronage in alien SLFP territory there could be a stampede at a power struggle. The SLFP is likely gang up to unfairly slant much of their own lapses on the rebels-orphaned without a patron. Unfortunately for the rebels they entered after the honeymoon period is over. They form a minuscule enclave in the SLFP

SLFP MP's without the JVP in their district lists can obtain the top slots in the results list by organizing the voters so that its parliamentarians are elected. Unlike to the JVP, SLFP supporters will not give their extra vote to the UNP rebels (maybe except for Karu Jayasuriya provided he performs well as a Minister!) and UNP and SLFP voters in collusion may eliminate parliamentary careers of many as it happened to those who crossed from the UNP previously. A switch back to the UNP may become possible if they realize their unelectable after enjoying the perks.

Time will tell whether the President beheaded the UNP or both the UNP and SLFP by taking the rebels. For the moment he is poised pretty on the top of a tsunami wave but will it crash on the beach? Rebels having successfully disoriented the UNP and can do the same to the SLFP by their conduct.

Impact on the JVP

JVP defeats itself being dogmatic and alienates the aspirations of the people by being rigidly over principled without a degree of flexibility; placing emphasis more on slogan than on substance. JVP with its hereditary immaturity cannot presently focus on governing but is targeting to lead the opposition unofficially in spirit and is within striking distance with a difference of five parliamentarians.

Next round of defections from the UNP can place the JVP in the saddle - Mahinda Rajapakse is more likely to save the UNP from the embarrassment than Ranil Wickremasinghe. JVP can emerge faster from the opposition benches than from the government ranks. Still it is capable of blowing it all with their stupidity. JVP's present strength lies in being workaholic, rooted to the ground and clean; with no greed for ministries like the rebels.

JVP is smarter in demolishing the UNP than bashing the SLFP. It can do still better against a joint SLFP-UNP government as it emerges as the attacking alternative .Have the rebels given the JVP an opportunity of a lifetime? Yet it is not capable of taking office with its sordid past record unless it gives a masterly performance as a skilled and responsible opposition. The impetus would be greater if there is a rift within the government.

Without having the SLFP as an ally it cannot command a high aggregate of votes and could lose parliamentary seats it presently holds. Drift of votes would be from UNP to SLFP, from SLFP to JVP and from JVP to SLFP and from JHU to JVP-it is too early to predict the density of the varied drifts which will finally reflect the result.

If the contest is on a dual carriage and not triangular JVP will be the casualty- the third party is often considered irrelevant on the eve of the election. The ultimate test is who performs effectively as the opposition? Decisive factor at the next election could be to decide who leads the opposition rather than who forms the government.

SLFP won the last two elections primarily due to the JVP campaign trail- and with fresh ammunition JVP firing squads would be deadly. It has a motivated band of young campaigners who can control the field and talk their way effectively on TV.

JVP can be shot down by an unfriendly media.

Impact on the JHU:

JHU being in the government is a check on the rebels and to keep the government rooted on the unitary state. The SLFP's assignment for the JHU would be to negative the JVP's onslaught on the government on the national question and to destabilize the JVP.A man instead of a monk has been selected craftily but he could be cast more in blue than saffron. JHU will be the infantry hit men of the SLFP against the JVP which may be countered with the lust for a ministry. The votes JHU obtains next time will depend on how effectively it carries out the functions designated.

In the process it can go the way the LSSP did-dependent on the SLFP to bail out a parliamentarian on the national list.

JHU has already lost its bulk vote to the UNP and the SLFP. It will fade away if the monks give way to laymen. It is the robes that took them to Parliament.

Rebels elected on the UNP slate and will enjoy a few crumbs on the SLFP plate.



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