How UNP-LTTE honeymoon saved LTTE from IPKF

By Shamindra Ferdinando Island

In the run up to the LTTE June 1990 offensive, the UNP asked the Israeli Interest Section to quit Sri Lanka, released a sizeable group of convicted LTTE terrorists, including Manohari Daniels, dubbed the Maradana bomber, handed over army bases at Valvettiturai and Point Pedro (captured during Operation Liberation in May-June 1987), financed the LTTE, facilitated the return of the London based Balasinghams and Europe based Mrs. Prabhakaran and her children. The UNP also helped ‘Colonel’ Kittu to receive medical treatment in the UK. Interestingly Kittu who allegedly received a pistol from General Sepala Attygalle as a gift was heard of again three years later when the Indian Navy intercepted an LTTE arms ship on the high seas in January 1993. Kittu, who led the massacre of rival Tamil groups, particularly the TELO in the aftermath of Thimpu talks, committed suicide to avoid capture by the Indian navy.

The government is under heavy fire over the recent LTTE air raids on Colombo and its suburbs, Katunayake and the Jaffna peninsula.

Critics, particularly the UNP, believe that the LTTE action effectively offsets a series of humiliating battlefield defeats the group suffered in the Eastern theatre beginning with the Mavilaru battle mid last year. They take the position that the air forays had belied claims that government forces had taken the upper hand.

They advance the opinion that the government’s war effort has suffered an irreversible setback and that the LTTE is set to go on the offensive. They articulate the view that the acquisition of aircraft would give the LTTE a strategic advantage over the security forces.

The LTTE action triggered calls for the immediate removal of Defence Secretary Colonel (retd) Gotabhaya Rajapakse (GR). UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe led the charge against GR. Critics accused GR of gross negligence and unprofessional conduct.

He had been severely criticised over the government human rights record and his inflexible approach towards the resolution of the national problem.

Interestingly, a negligible section of the ruling SLFP subscribed to the UNP campaign. Mangala Samaraweera led the now defunct offensive which was backed by a section of the media.

The criticism over the LTTE air intrusions comes hot on the heels of ridiculous accusations that the LTTE engineered UNP candidate Wickremesinghe’s defeat at the last presidential poll in November, 2005 after receiving a massive financial inducement from the Rajapakse brothers. Obviously the UNP is desperately trying to sell a puppy to the gullible public.

Absence of air defence system

The absence of an efficient air defence system partly due to India’s opposition to the acquisition of an advanced Chinese 3D Radar network during the tailend of Chandrika Kumaratunga’s presidency made the Tigers’ task easier.

India is in the process of installing an indigenous 2D Radar network which she gifted Sri Lanka to scuttle the Chinese deal.

Had the SLAF acquired an air to air strike capability, the Indian radar or the radar located at the BIA would have been able to guide a fixed wing aircraft to intercept the oncoming enemy aircraft. Even if Sri Lanka acquired 3D Radar network, the absence of properly equipped aircraft to cut off approaching aircraft would tantamount a zero defence.

GR in consultation with the SLAF top brass must take immediate measures to neutralise the LTTE threat.

Lifeline to LTTE

Having said that, let me examine the UNP-LTTE honeymoon during President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s presidency, the Eelam War II (June 1990-January 1995) upto the May Day (1993) assassination of President Premadasa and, most importantly, the dreadful implications of gross negligence on the part of the then ruling party. In fact, the UNP gave a lifeline to the LTTE, reeling under severe IPKF pressure and saved it from annihilation by its maker. Sri Lanka had had the unique opportunity to have used the IPKF to eliminate the LTTE.

Had Premadasa genuinely practicsed what he preached, the IPKF would have wiped out the LTTE. Premadasa repeatedly declared that peace would be restored through three Cs, viz. consultation, consensus and compromise. The three Cs drive was a major plank of his presidential election campaign. But once he secured the presidency, he embarked on a campaign to bring in both the JVP and the LTTE into the political mainstream.

In the absence of sound advice, the President compromised national security. Had his ministerial colleagues and advisors resisted Premadasa’s adventure, the LTTE would have been history. Fearing Premadasa’s wrath, they simply subscribed to the President’s formula. It was a blueprint for disaster. Ironically, the JVP and Mrs. Bandaranaike’s SLFP unwittingly backed Premadasa’s faulty strategy which the LTTE cleverly manipulated to its advantage. On the instruction of the LTTE, the government called for unilateral withdrawal of the IPKF.

Did the UNP understand the Tamil mind-set or the strategies of the LTTE?

Once the UNP government was committed to the IPKF’s removal, there was no turning back. The stage was set for a bloody phase in the conflict dubbed the Eelam War II.

The LTTE manipulated Sri Lanka’s fear that India intended to maintain a permanent military presence here. The LTTE snared Premadasa and Company. The IPKF completed its pull out by March 24, 1990. The LTTE launched attacks on June 10, 1990.

The UNP had never apologised for strategic blunders it committed during the 14th month honeymoon and the subsequent war. A comprehensive study would reveal that the Premadasa’s administration massively blundered and, in fact, caused irreparable losses. The loss of a stretch of the Jaffna-Kandy A9 road is a case in point.

Premadasa blamed

After Premadasa’s assassination, the UNP squarely blamed the slain leader for the debacle. Did any of his ministerial colleagues, service chiefs, and Inspector General of Police and security advisors oppose his strategy? Did anyone of them back his plan? Did they at least try to prevent him from compromising national security? Had they intervened to prevent the LTTE from forcing the President’s hand, the situation would have been different. In his haste to appease the LTTE, Premadasa disregarded any drawbacks in relation to the security scenario and relations with India.

None other than J. N. Dixit admitted their blunder. One time Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka J. N. Dixit admitted in Makers of India’s Foreign Policy-Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha , "the two foreign policy decisions on which she (Premier Indira Gandhi) could be faulted are her ambiguous response to the Russian intrusion into Afghanistan and her GIVING ACTIVE SUPPORT TO SRI LANKAN TAMIL MILITANTS (emphasis is mine) Whatever the criticism about these decisions, it cannot be denied that she took them on the basis of the assessments about India’s national interests. Whatever, India’s faults and ambiguity in relation to the deployment of IPKF under the July 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord, Sri Lanka had the opportunity to use the world’s fourth largest army to unravel the LTTE terror network.

Let me recall R. Premadasa’s erroneous strategy to tackle two anti-systemic insurgencies by the LTTE and the JVP shortly after he narrowly won the December 19th, 1988 presidential elections. Although unconnected, they had a major common goal. They wanted India to withdraw her armed forces from the temporarily merged North-East Province. R. Premadasa, in what he thought was a shrewd move lifted the countrywide emergency on January 12 (he assumed the office of the President on January 2, 1989) and ordered the release of 1,800 JVP suspects in custody. This was done against the advice of his colleagues. Premadasa’s action gave a fresh impetus to the bloody JVP campaign. He ordered the release of about 50 JVP suspects in army custody immediately after the second presidential mobile service held in Matara.

Although some of his colleagues and advisors opposed the release of JVP cadres, they backed the decision to initiate a direct dialogue with the LTTE.

Monumental blunder

On April 12, 1989 R. Premadasa declared a unilateral ceasefire to coincide with the Sinhala and Tamil New Year. The unprecedented action was followed by the public announcement made at a temple ceremony at Battaramulla that the IPKF should pull out by July 29. The President also asked India to suspend offensive action against the LTTE. The President committed a monumental blunder by demanding the withdrawal of Indian forces within three months. This was done to appease the LTTE and the consequences of R. Premadasa’s action are even felt today. Premadasa’s ill-fated strategy facilitated the transformation of the LTTE from essentially a terrorist organisation with one with a conventional military capability.

The President was mistrustful of New Delhi’s intentions as he was fully aware of the giant neighbour’s role in recruiting, training, arming and deploying Tamil youth against Sri Lanka. In fact, without India’a active assistance, Tamil terrorists would not have gained the experience to overwhelm Sri Lankan forces, thereby facilitating the eventual deployment of Indian forces here. In his anxiety to get rid of the IPKF, Premadasa missed a golden opportunity to wipe out the monster, created as a result of Indira Gandhi’s folly.

Official figures indicated that the IPKF lost 1155 officers and men. The number of officers and men wounded in action was placed at 3,000.

India reacted furiously to Premadasa’s idiotic action. India ignored Premadasa’s call to confine remaining IPKF troops to their barracks in the event of India’s failure to complete the withdrawal by July 29. As part of the measures to undermine Premadasa’s administration, India formed a militia under the political leadership of the EPRLF to face the Premadasa-Prabhakaran axis.

Costly affair

In conclusion, the lessons learnt from Premadasa’s disastrous effort proved to be both bitter and costly. Sri Lanka would have faced a gigantic crisis had Congress I returned to power at the November 1989 parliamentary elections. Much to the UNP’s relief, V. P. Singh ousted Gandhi, thereby giving hope that India could be persuaded to withdraw her forces. I am sure, the LTTE and the Tamil Nadu administration felt the same. That was the undeniable truth. In the immediate aftermath of V. P Singh’s triumph, Premadasa’s sent State Minister for Defence Ranjan Wijeratne to explore the possibility of expediting the IPKF pull out. External Affairs Minister Inder Kumar Gujral as expected gave an assurance that India would pull out her forces.

Had Rajiv Gandhi retained power, Premadasa would have had to face an immensely powerful hostile force. This, against the backdrop of Premadasa’s hostility towards India in general and Rajiv Gandhi in particular would have placed Sri Lanka in an extremely difficult position.

Premadasa hand picked his team. He kept Messrs Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake out of the secret process. A.C.S. Hameed, Ranil W. Ranjan Wijeratne, Sirisena Cooray, U.B. Wijekoon, P. Dayaratne took part in the first round (May 4-May 30, 1989) of talks held in Hilton and Galadari.

The second round (June 16-July 2, 1989) was also held in Colombo. Premadasa included Festus Perera and A. R Mandoor in the delegation. The third round was held in November 1989 at Sucharitha with the participation of Premadasa, Hameed and Ranjan Wijeratne. Among the officials present were Defence Secretary Sepala Attygalle, presidential secretary K.H.J Wijedasa, Foreign Secretary Bernard Tillekaratne and International Affairs Advisor Bradman Weerakoon,

Felix Dias Abeysinghe, a former polls department chief who drafted routine press releases issued after the meetings was also present. But there was no press release after the third round.

The senseless handling of the peace process would have been grounds for the impeachment of President Premadasa. Unfortunately, the October 91 bid to impeach Premadasa was fuelled by political greediness. The Opposition should have moved a no-confidence motion against the UNP over the catastrophe caused by the government’s action.

Did Army Commander Lt. General Hamilton Wanasinghe, Defence Secretary General (redt) Sepala Attygalle and presidential security advisor General (redt) Cyril Ranatunga resist that Premadasa strategy? Wanasinghe recently took over Sri Lanka Ex-Servicemen Association. Wanasinghe should have been asked to explain his role during the UNP-LTTE honeymoon.

Had the army in the East surrendered as the police did when instructed by the UNP, what would have happened. The LTTE massacred about 500 policemen after the UNP ordered them to surrender after the LTTE initiated attacks. Despite the UNP order, a section of the army regardless of the consequences ignored the directive. Troops deployed in the East were directed not to resist the LTTE after the LTTE killed a dozen soldiers, stripped them of their arms and uniforms and set their bodies on fire. The UNP believed that the LTTE would return to the negotiating table if police and security forces surrendered to underscore the UNP’s commitment to a negotiated settlement. Had the army given into political pressure, the consequences would have been catastrophic.

Who let Yogi go?

Amidst chaos in the East, the UNP flew a group of LTTE cadres, including high flyer Yogi to Palaly. A contingent of STF personnel helped the LTTE squad to board a Chinese built Y 12 SLAF flight at Ratmalana air base. Five large boxes were also loaded. The UNP ignored the possibility of detaining Yogi in a bid to negotiate for the release of policemen in LTTE captivity.

The UNP was at the receiving end. The LTTE used arms, ammunition and equipment received from the UNP government to attack security forces and police. The LTTE’s arsenal included a massive consignment of arms, ammunition and equipment captured from the EPRLF-led militia formed by the IPKF. The routing of the EPRLF’s militia would not have been a reality. But the UNP facilitated the LTTE offensive by tactical deployment of government forces and also providing logistics.

Although the UNP overcame the LTTE challenge in the East, a series of devastating attacks forced the army to vacate bases between Vauniya and Elephant Pass. For the first time in the conflict, the army lost total control of the Vavuniya-Elephant Pass stretch thereby isolating the forces deployed in the Jaffna peninsula. For 17 years the road stretch remains under LTTE control with the army totally depending on the navy and air force for all their supplies. An ambitious bid made during CBK’s tenure failed to restore the overland main supply route. Had the army successfully resisted the attacks on the bases which controlled the road, the LTTE would not have a free run in the Wanni region. Maybe the LTTE would not have had the freedom to launch fixed wing aircraft from the Wanni region had troops controlled the overland route to Jaffna.

Confidence-building-measures

In the run up to the LTTE June 1990 offensive, the UNP asked the Israeli Interest Section to quit Sri Lanka, released a sizeable group of convicted LTTE terrorists, including Manohari Daniels, dubbed the Maradana bomber, handed over army bases at Valvettiturai and Point Pedro (captured during Operation Liberation in May-June 1987), financed the LTTE, facilitated the return of the London based Balasinghams and Europe based Mrs. Prabhakaran and her children. The UNP also helped ‘Colonel’ Kittu to receive medical treatment in the UK. Interestingly Kittu who allegedly received a pistol from General Sepala Attygalle as a gift was heard of again three years later when the Indian Navy intercepted an LTTE arms ship on the high seas in January 1993. Kittu, who led the massacre of rival Tamil groups, particularly the TELO in the aftermath of Thimpu talks, committed suicide to avoid capture by the Indian navy.