Are We on Course? : A critical
analysis of few recent battles
Dilrook Kannangara
Identifying real root causes help solve the matter while parroting
nonsense will ensure that nothing is solved and sorted out. Pointing
out the weaknesses in the military strategy is the task of responsible
media. However, due to the fact that there are no free media institutions
in Sri Lanka gives rise to a dangerous situation where such responsibility
does not exist. While the government media parrots out government propaganda,
most other media regurgitate LTTE propaganda. The truth remains uncaptured
by both. What is the result? Nonsense continues unreported, unabated
and uncorrected. It is the aim of this article to point out such hot
air surrounding the war strategy and war reporting (these are interconnected
with the morale of the security forces) with the expectation that both
will benefit eventually by proper corrective action.
It is appalling how the government reports battlefield events thus losing
its credibility. Losing a battle is one thing and losing face is another.
Apparently the government is now losing both!
I draw attention to the following two events published in two government
controlled websites on the same event.
Ministry of defence report - At least 52 LTTE terrorists were killed
while scores of terrorist casualties were on the rise following counter
attacks from troops at an LTTE offensive advance at Muhamalai this morning,
security sources said……………..Security forces
had full control over the LTTE bunkers till 7.a.m and later consolidated
positions along the defences, the sources said…………..
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20071107_07 Last modified on: 11/7/2007
9:41:30 PM
Media Centre for National Security - JAFFNA : According to intercepted
Tiger communication around 52 LTTE cadres have perished in attacks by
advancing troops in MUHAMALAI this morning……………The
LTTE bunker line was under the control of the Security Forces until
7.00 a.m. this morning……………
http://www.nationalsecurity.lk/fullnews.php?id=8400 7 Nov 2007 - 18:52
2nd Lead
Issue #1
The Ministry of Defence report calls the battle “an LTTE offensive
advance” while MCNS calls the same as “attacks by advancing
troops”. Out of the two contradictory reports which one is correct?
Was it the LTTE or the SLA that was on the initial offensive advance?
Issue #2
Both reports agree that the security forces were in control of LTTE
bunkers till 7 am; what happened thereafter? The MoD report says that
the security forces “later consolidated positions along the defences”.
This means the security forces lost control of the bunker lines after
7 am and retreated to the FDL once again. This is in conformity with
the reports in the LTTE website; which additionally carries photos suggesting
the LTTE has regained control of their bunkers with the added advantage
of capturing a large haul of weapons from the SLA.
Simply put it the SLA operation was a complete blunder.
This is not the first time SLA advances from the Jaffna peninsula were
halted; same thing happened almost a year ago. These two major battles
and their outcomes point out towards a very dangerous fact – the
LTTE can beat the SLA in a conventional battle. Security forces were
successful in routing the terrorists in the East which is a major victory;
they used jungle warfare very effectively and defeated the terrorists
in their own game; remarkable. However, the LTTE seems to have the edge
in the North where conventional warfare takes place with clear FDLs
and a clear enemy face to face (more or less). Worse still, the SLA
was backed by gunships, MBRLs and firefinder mortars.
Something is terribly wrong with the strategy employed by the security
forces. The easy answer to this is that experienced and learned Generals,
Brigadiers, etc. know what to do and need no advice and/or opinions
from laymen. But that doesn’t make things any better and it is
tax payers’ money, country, children, etc. that are at war and
hence they have a right to point things out. Besides the SLA has consecutively
proven their inability to beat the LTTE in the North in the recent past
and a second opinion, after all, will surely not go wasted. Even the
most capable Prince Dutugemunu had a vital lesson to learn from an old
granny which proved victorious!! His nephew, King Walagamba also learnt
a good lesson from a spider!! Compared to them, the present military
top brass are, to say the least, not big shots.
Issue #3
The biggest LTTE attack took place in October 2007 in Anuradhapura where
26 aircrafts were attacked by the LTTE. This is therefore worse than
the 2001 terror attack. Altogether Sri Lanka has lost more than 60 aircrafts
(including Airlanka and Srilankan planes) from 1983. Can a poor nation
like ours afford to lose so much? No way. It places the SLAF among the
top losers in world history par with air force casualties in WW1, WW2,
Korean War, Vietnam War, the first Afghanistan War by the SU, Iraq in
second Iraq War and the 1967 Israel-Egypt/Syria War. This is outrageous!
The manner in which the government reported the recent terror attack
is even more disgusting. Something must be done immediately to arrest
the situation.
Battlefield losses sustained by Sri Lankan forces should not be covered-up.
Instead a productive debate must be encouraged among educated patriots
on what to do next. Going along the same beaten track has proven disastrous
not so much for the top brass and the government, but for the nation,
its taxpayers, families, its reputation and law and order.
Providing security to national assets is the task of the forces including
the paramilitaries; the general public can only assist. Some sections
of the public reserve their right to be of any assistance for obvious
reasons. However, the forces cannot blame anyone else but themselves
for security lapses. Constant patrolling around important locations
by patrolling units must be established. All such locations must have
STF presence and constant reconnaissance and search operations in the
area must be carried out. All legal and other means must be used in
conjunction with paramilitary cadres to safeguard national assets at
all costs.
However, the best form of defence remains to be a hard offence. The
weakest links in the LTTE must be identified, singled-out and smashed
quickly. LTTE’s strong points are the following: a global financing
network; a global procurement network, a large section of the Tamil
Diaspora that supports the LTTE; support and sympathy of many INGOs/charities/HR
monitoring groups/other terror groups. There is little we can do (in
addition to what has been done already) to affect these tiger strengths.
LTTE’s weak points are the following.
· Extreme cowardice of Tamil Elam supporters and the resultant
low number of cadres – the most generous estimate is 30,000 cadres,
regular and ancillary. The huge Tamil Diaspora, although supports it
generously are damned scared to fight along the LTTE in wide contrast
to other terror groups like Al Qaeda, Mujahidin, IRA, etc. where well-wishers
travelled from all corners of the world to fight along their brethren.
Cowardice is the underlying theme of the decades old Tamil struggle.
Forced recruitments, non-participation of the large Tamil Diaspora in
warfare, Child soldiers, hired Indian fighters and suicide bombers are
only the by-products of this cowardice. This is the greatest opportunity
that can be exploited by the security forces. To capitalise on this,
maximum casualties should be levied upon the LTTE’; “flush-out”
strategies do not add any value. A ‘harvesting’ strategy must
be devised. High LTTE concentrations must be targeted at all times by
the SLAF and other forces. Active air support with the aim of “maximum
casualties” must be present during all ground and sea battles.
Sadly very few battles get active air support and even when it happens,
the aim is to chase away the terrorists than kill them. MBRL fire should
be aimed at ‘harvesting’ a large number of terrorists than
use it as a ‘scorch earth’ method. Knowing this, the tigers
initially withdraw allowing the SLA to capture their bunkers and then
charge-in and recapture them.
· Dictatorial leadership and heavy dependence on one person –
unlike successful terror/rebel groups including the Vietnam guerrillas,
Al Qaeda, Sinn Fen/IRA, JI, the LTTE does not have a collaborative leadership
style. Its leadership is Parabakaran only and any deviation, disagreement
or dissent surely carries the death penalty. As a result, there is no
alternative leader capable of taking the LTTE forward. Well capable
leaders like Mahattaya, Karuna, Paduman, etc. were eliminated from the
LTTE. This is another valuable opportunity for the security forces.
All attempts must be made to hunt down Parabakaran like a wild beast
in a game hunt. Unfortunately, there have not been any attempts on his
life by the security forces. This is the reality the gullible taxpayers
are kept out of. For an instance, it should have been expected that
Parabakaran would either go to the funeral of Tamilselvan or the corpse
would be taken to him. A single UAV flight could have captured this
moment and alerted the SLAF. However, no such attempt was made; not
even discussed or mentioned by the defence establishment! Killing of
Tamilselvan achieved nothing as he was effortlessly replaced. Therefore
Parabakaran’s dearest friends have always been the Sri Lankan government
and its incapable security forces; incapable of killing just one man
for 24 long years. He knows he has impunity and therefore can go on
killing and bombing anyone and anything without getting even a bruise.
In the same token, he decides who rules Lanka and when he should leave
office. Going by Lankan credentials, contrary to promises given by the
Defence Secretary and the Prime Minister, Parabakaran will never be
targeted by the security forces! There are millions of excuses for not
doing so; however, the real reason is the incompetence of the whole
Defence establishment.
· The Island nation – Lanka being an island nation has an
added advantage of the ease of controlling weapons flow to tigers. Unlike
in the case of Mujahidin, Al Qaeda, JI, Hamas, Hezbollah or any other
terror group, the LTTE has to maintain a large fleet of ships, ports,
feeder crafts, boats, their defences and other infrastructure, manpower
and skills required to maintain arms shipments. They have done a fantastic
job in doing so which talks volumes of SLN’s incompetency. Bombs
the size of a lorry have been imported along with shiploads of shells,
planes (some were transported to them by traitors) and other stuff repeatedly.
LTTE’s earlier claims that SLA is their biggest supplier (the SLA
must be ashamed of this) have been superseded by the weakness of the
SL Navy. However, the recent spate of success of SLN must be congratulated.
A proper naval unit alone can suffocate the LTTE into extermination.
Although the SLAF had wiped out many LTTE ports, many still function
and the security forces are in possession of details of such places.
Strangely, these remain untouched.
Sea battles are another instance where big blunders are made. Instead
of destroying all LTTE boats, the SLN and SLAF used to chase them off;
chase them to Sri Lanka! What good does it do? Using published figures
by the MoD, in almost all successful battles, the success rate has been
less than 50%. If all boats in the LTTE flotilla are sunk, then and
only then the attack can be a success.
Any and all tiger sea movements must be attended to by the SLN and SLAF
with 100% destruction rate which can be easily achievable with the available
technology.
· Weapons warehouses and positions – Inland LTTE weapons
flow has never been targeted by the forces. During times of LTTE mortar
fire, it is child’s play to detect their mortar locations from
air and fire upon them. Heavy mortar launchers, piles of mortar stocks
and transport facilities can be easily targeted. Due to the incompetency
of the SLAF and the defence authorities, instead gunships are left to
defend themselves on ground!
On the other hand, the biggest weak point in the Sri Lankan camp is
the lack of accountability. First of all the truth is hidden from the
public under the guise of ‘protecting the moral of the security
forces’ so that the incompetent sitting ducks can have an easy
go. Nobody has ever assumed responsibility to debacles and everybody
in top places continues to occupy high positions funded by the taxpayers.
To make matters worse, there is a major political movement to defeat
the security forces that also propagates surrender.
But the worst lot are those patriots who keep silent about blunders
and continue to support the government to waste time, money and opportunity.
They may live in a fools’ paradise until time shows them wrong.
Alternatively they can pressurise the government and the security forces
to change the strategy as above to get results. Please distribute this
to every grateful Sri Lankan, grateful enough to wish what is right
and just for Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka deserves a better military strategy
and a more competent execution.
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