Senator
Leahy's Statement - Towards his Better Understanding of the Sri Lankan
Problem
By Neville Ladduwahetty
Courtesy: The Island
In his address to the US Senate, Senator Patrick Leahy stated: "We
also recognize that the LTTE should not be equated with the Tamil community.
There are many ethnic Tamils living in and outside of Sri Lanka who
do not condone acts of violence and terrorism against civilians. Many
have been victims of the LTTE themselves" (Sunday Times, November
4, 2007). Continuing, he added: "We want Sri Lanka to succeed in
stopping terrorism, and we recognize that military force can be necessary
against terrorist tactics". But there is no military solution to
the Sri Lankan conflict…"(Ibid).
Many believe that while Sri Lanka's conflict cannot be resolved purely
militarily, its resolution requires the neutralization of the LTTE's
ability to resort to terrorism as a tactic that it uses to realize its
political goals. Initiating negotiations prior to reaching such a point
would mean negotiating separate arrangements, one with the LTTE and
another with the Tamil community, because the two entities cannot be
equated as acknowledged by Senator Leahy. This difference makes each
entity seek political arrangements with different horizons.
This is the dilemma that the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) would face
if negotiations are initiated without addressing the capabilities of
the LTTE. The failure to appreciate the nuances of caste and social
mores within the Tamil community, and consequently with the conflict
situation in Sri Lanka has caused prominent and influential members
of the International Community (IC) such as Senator Leahy to recommend
policies that in fact subvert the efforts of the GOSL to reach a required
vital stage without which the conflict cannot hope to be resolved.
Unlike other entities resorting to violence in order to redress grievances
where there is a convergence of interests between those engaged in the
conflict and those on whose behalf the conflict is conducted, the inability
to forge a common cause between the LTTE and the Tamil community makes
Sri Lanka's conflict unique. The military capabilities of the LTTE are
what enable the perpetuation of the divergence of interests. For interests
to converge it is necessary for the military capabilities to be neutralized
to a state that makes the rewards of negotiations more meaningful than
the prospects of armed conflict. It was only upon reaching such a state
that it became possible for conflicts in the Northern Ireland and Banda
Aceh to be resolved.
IMPACT OF DIVERGENT INTERESTS
The Tamil community would settle for a political solution not involving
military capabilities. The LTTE on the other hand, would only settle
for a political arrangement that ensures retention of their military.
Since the LTTE is not likely to voluntarily give up their capabilities
to commit violence, the GOSL has no option other than to take steps
to neutralize such capabilities. A political arrangement with these
capabilities intact is not an acceptable option either for the Sri Lankan
nation or for the Tamil community. This is the strategy the GOSL is
currently engaged in. The option of allowing the LTTE's military capabilities
to remain intact would result in the situation continuing to simmer
endlessly without closure. This is not acceptable either for the Tamil
community or for other communities, if Sri Lanka as a nation is to develop
and pursue its collective aspirations.
There is a growing impatience in the country to proceed with containing
the ability of the LTTE to engage in violence. They see the lack of
security to their personal selves being a direct result of the LTTE's
ability to resort to violence. At the same time they realize that the
LTTE is not in a position to realize its political goals through violence.
These realities have resulted in a growing consensus in the country
that the Government should neutralize effectively, the LTTE's capabilities
to engage in violence once and for all. In this background, the Senator
Leahy's comment that: "We want Sri Lanka to succeed in stopping
terrorism and we recognize that military force can be necessary against
terrorist tactics" is welcome. If Human Rights violations are to
be minimized in the process of the desirable goal of "stopping
terrorism", the US is in a position to help Sri Lanka with technically
sophisticated military hardware to minimize harming civilians, and target
specifically, the military capabilities of the LTTE.
Senator Leahy will I am sure concede that it is not possible to stop
terrorism sparing civilians completely. The GOSL has at no time adopted
strategies to put civilians in harms way as part of a deliberate strategy
in order to stop terrorism. The best that can be hoped for is that violations
are minimized and that this minimum is a result of unintended consequences.
Violations can be minimized by superior technology. In this regard,
assistance from the US and other members of the IC can be invaluable.
In fact, strategies to minimize violations would be far more effective
from a humanitarian standpoint than monitoring violations after they
occur, which is the proposal of the Senator when he recommends "the
establishment of a field presence of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights in Sri Lanka"(Ibid).
COMMON INTEREST OF TERRITORY
However divergent the interests between the LTTE and the Tamil community
may be, they have common cause on the issue of territory. Even though
they may differ in regard to the scope and extent of political power
they are both committed to the territorial claim of the Northern and
Eastern Provinces. It is this single issue that makes Sri Lanka's national
question so intractable. The overwhelming majority see the territorial
claim for the two provinces that together constitute 1/3 the land mass
of the island, along with the resources along 2/3 of its coastline,
unreasonable and unjust. This majority sees devolving power to such
a region as a division of the country in whatever shape or form it is
packaged and presented to the public. Consequently, attempts by successive
governments to arrive at a compromise to satisfy the majority as well
as the Tamil community have failed, and will continue to fail as long
as this remains a demand. The recent developments in the Eastern Province
demanding political identities separate and independent from the Northern
Province, makes the territorial claim for a merged unit even more unjust.
REACHING A SOUTHERN CONSENSUS
Territory being central to any political solution, successive governments
have attempted to base solutions on the Northern and Eastern Provinces
as a single political unit to satisfy the territorial expectations of
the Tamil community. Since the concept entails a revision to the Constitution,
acceptance of the proposal requires 2/3 approval by Parliament as well
as approval by a referendum. Obtaining the consent of 2/3 in Parliament
is an unrealistic proposition because the perception of a considerable
majority is that a political unit comprising the Northern and Eastern
Provinces would divide the country however innocuous its political powers.
Aside from the perception of vulnerability to the territorial integrity
of the country, the play of coalition politics in Sri Lanka is such
that a 2/3 majority would require mustering the support of the small
peripheral political parties represented in Parliament. Since the support
base of these parties are from the traditional segments of society,
a merged unit would be politically unacceptable to them. This is no
different to the recent development in India where the US-India nuclear
deal was squashed by a coalition party. The alternative of the two major
parties getting together is equally unrealistic given their open rivalry.
The result of these existential realities is that any political proposal
that involves a Constitutional revision is unrealistic. The prospect
for Sri Lanka thus boils down to settling for the existing constitutional
arrangements with any possible revisions and improvements that can be
implemented within existing provisions, and in the meantime, for the
necessary steps to be taken that would make the country safe from terrorism.
This may be a disappointing proportion for some but it is the hard reality
and the country has to have the courage to accept it.
CONCLUSION
Senator Leahy's conclusion that even as LTTE terrorism must be dealt
with militarily, there is no military solution to the problem, is acknowledged
by many. The GOSL itself is aware that a political arrangement should
go parallel with its efforts to neutralize the capabilities of the LTTE
to engage in terrorism and violence. It is this realization that caused
the current Sri Lanka Government to set up the All Party Conference
(APC) and the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) to work out
an acceptable political proposal. Despite serious efforts by these Committees
little headway has been possible because of the complexities and nuances
associated with Sri Lanka's national question.
At the heart of this is the unreasonableness of the expectations of
the Tamil community. The original expectation was a 50-50 share for
minorities in the Cabinet of Ministers. A counter offer of 60-40 was
rejected. This has been followed with a territorial demand for 1/3 the
land mass of the island that involves 2/3 of its coastline. Powers devolved
to such a politico/territorial unit is perceived by a considerable majority
of Sri Lankans as a threat to the security to the nation, arising from
a very real vulnerability to the territorial integrity of the state.
Consequently, reaching a consensus on the contours of the territorial
claim has been a daunting task for the APRC.
Even if a hypothetical consensus is reached within the confines of
the APRC, the proposals would entail a revision to the Constitution.
This would require approval by 2/3 of the members of Parliament and
approval by an island-wide referendum. This is very unlikely, given
the prevailing political formations in Parliament that are the upshot
of the current electoral process. On the other hand, a southern consensus
may be possible if the Government Ruling Party and the JVP with their
39 Parliamentary members could arrive at a common politico/territorial
formula. This however, would not meet the expectations of the Tamil
community and meet those of the LTTE even less.
However sincere and committed the GOSL may be, the existential realities
are such that forging a political solution that would address the security
concerns of the Sri Lankan nation and meet the expectations of the Tamil
community has proved elusive. The LTTE's military and terror capabilities
are a distraction to this entire process.
The only realistic option open to the GOSL at the present time is to
make existing provisions as effective as possible and modified to include
minority participation at the center within existing constitutional
provisions and focus on the development of the country, with some special
attention to those areas neglected due to the conflict. The single most
important contribution that influential members of the IC and the US,
such as Senator Leahy can make is to recognize that the uniqueness of
the situation in Sri Lanka makes bold initiatives in the sphere of political
proposals an unrealistic undertaking; a recognition that must convince
the IC that a different stance is necessary regarding their recommendations
and policies towards Sri Lanka.
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