Normandy Campaign in Vanni
Should Begin Now
Dilrook Kannangara
The success of the two years old military strategy has been the sustenance
of the upper hand in battle by the security forces. Any momentary slip
may mean disaster as the terrorists would capitalise on that. Therefore,
after the devastating terror attack on the Anuradhapura air force base
what should be done is to quickly avenge thereby regaining the upper
hand. Two MI-24 gunships and a Bell 212 copter on a mission is not a
simple defeat; it is a substantial loss and a major defeat for the SLAF.
Further, the combined attack of the Tiger Air Force with crap bombs
supported by ground terrorists poses a new threat. To counter this threat,
both ground attack capability and aerial attack capability should be
present, simultaneously. Unfortunately the wisdom of the retired generals
has proven for once (after failing most of the time). It was General
Munasinghe who pointed out six months ago that the terrorists could
launch a mortar attack and when the armed forces personnel take cover,
a terror air attack may be launched. It happened with devastating consequences.
Complacency may have played a part in the defence establishment and
also at the camp as there was no terror air attack for a long time.
In addition the attack comes only a few weeks after a high powered delegation
went to Anuradhapura and Trinco to look into the claims of sightings
of unidentified planes.
What has happened has happened; the remaining air bases and economic
nerve centres need to be protected with vigilance and by eliminating
LTTE infiltrators using all effective means. Giving into the demands
of human rights humbugs and curtailing some of the successful paramilitary
operations will spell doom. After all Louise Arbour or any other HR
activist cannot replenish the losses caused by terror attacks. Again
it is that time when foresight, courage and planning capabilities of
the Defence Secretary are sought by the nation.
The terror attack can be a good starting point for a violent onslaught
on tiger territory the nation has been waiting for. Apparently the LTTE
has laid down a ‘three-layered defensive infrastructure’ in
Vanni according to news reports published by a section of the media.
Whether this is psychological warfare or not is yet to be seen. However,
tigers are going to fight a bitter battle to defend what is left of
their Tamil Elam. Most likely, they would try to infiltrate into the
area held by the security forces in an offensive operation than sit
back and wait for the advancing army.
It is yet to be seen how the SLAF jets can provide active ground support
during a battle as it has not happened in the past. Only exception was
the marvellous 1995 August onslaught on the tigers in a battle in Weli
Oya where hundreds of terrorists perished. Lesson should be learnt from
the tiger attack in Anuradhapura.
It is surprising how the LTTE still has a massive arsenal of mortars,
especially heavy mortars of 120mm and upwards. Surely the UAVs and ‘ground
sources of information’ should have revealed about arms transport
routes, where they originate from and other hyper-activity centres.
Knowing that the army is advancing from all fronts, the LTTE is unlikely
to scatter its weapons storages through out Vanni especially around
the borders of their territory, but rather retain its warehouses in
heavily protected locations in Vanni. Storing heavy mortars as per specifications
require very large areas; heavy trucks, tractors etc. must be roaming
around. There are no other machinery operators in Vanni other than the
LTTE. Therefore, it cannot be difficult to track down tiger logistics
and destroy them before the armed forces take a beating. Even if it
takes to destroy most of the jungle areas in the hunt for terrorists,
it is worth it.
Mass exodus of civilians out of Vanni has not happened yet. This is
what the LTTE fears most; in case of a civilian displacement exposing
the tigers, it will be no more than a training exercise for the army
to hunt down the terrorists while sweeping the refugee camps for infiltrators.
Therefore, the tigers will do their utmost to retain civilians in Vanni.
However, it takes only a few retaliatory air strikes to chase them away
from the battle zone to safety. This is the trump card the security
forces have against any terror attack in the south. A bare-bone LTTE
can never survive the ‘scorch earth’ warfare that awaits them
in such an eventuality.
Lankan defence authorities must take into account some of the successful
strategies employed by the Allied forces in the 62 year old Normandy
Campaign code named ‘Operation Overload’; true to its name,
a very large tonnage of bombs were dropped from the air exploiting very
well the Allied air superiority over the Germans. Therefore, instead
of wasting scant resources in dozens of millions of dollars on superior
fighters like MiG-29, which is an excess to the Sri Lankan needs, the
government should rather buy heavy explosives that can penetrate the
‘three-layered defensive infrastructure’ and that can be delivered
by the existing fleet. Further delays in exterminating the terrorists
will only complicate the matter. At least now, the defence establishment
must take fast track extermination strategies.
The success of the two years old military strategy has been the sustenance
of the upper hand in battle by the security forces. Any momentary slip
may mean disaster as the terrorists would capitalise on that. Therefore,
after the devastating terror attack on the Anuradhapura air force base
what should be done is to quickly avenge thereby regaining the upper
hand. Two MI-24 gunships and a Bell 212 copter on a mission is not a
simple defeat; it is a substantial loss and a major defeat for the SLAF.
Further, the combined attack of the Tiger Air Force with crap bombs
supported by ground terrorists poses a new threat. To counter this threat,
both ground attack capability and aerial attack capability should be
present, simultaneously. Unfortunately the wisdom of the retired generals
has proven for once (after failing most of the time). It was General
Munasinghe who pointed out six months ago that the terrorists could
launch a mortar attack and when the armed forces personnel take cover,
a terror air attack may be launched. It happened with devastating consequences.
Complacency may have played a part in the defence establishment and
also at the camp as there was no terror air attack for a long time.
In addition the attack comes only a few weeks after a high powered delegation
went to Anuradhapura and Trinco to look into the claims of sightings
of unidentified planes.
What has happened has happened; the remaining air bases and economic
nerve centres need to be protected with vigilance and by eliminating
LTTE infiltrators using all effective means. Giving into the demands
of human rights humbugs and curtailing some of the successful paramilitary
operations will spell doom. After all Louise Arbour or any other HR
activist cannot replenish the losses caused by terror attacks. Again
it is that time when foresight, courage and planning capabilities of
the Defence Secretary are sought by the nation.
The terror attack can be a good starting point for a violent onslaught
on tiger territory the nation has been waiting for. Apparently the LTTE
has laid down a ‘three-layered defensive infrastructure’ in
Vanni according to news reports published by a section of the media.
Whether this is psychological warfare or not is yet to be seen. However,
tigers are going to fight a bitter battle to defend what is left of
their Tamil Elam. Most likely, they would try to infiltrate into the
area held by the security forces in an offensive operation than sit
back and wait for the advancing army.
It is yet to be seen how the SLAF jets can provide active ground support
during a battle as it has not happened in the past. Only exception was
the marvellous 1995 August onslaught on the tigers in a battle in Weli
Oya where hundreds of terrorists perished. Lesson should be learnt from
the tiger attack in Anuradhapura.
It is surprising how the LTTE still has a massive arsenal of mortars,
especially heavy mortars of 120mm and upwards. Surely the UAVs and ‘ground
sources of information’ should have revealed about arms transport
routes, where they originate from and other hyper-activity centres.
Knowing that the army is advancing from all fronts, the LTTE is unlikely
to scatter its weapons storages through out Vanni especially around
the borders of their territory, but rather retain its warehouses in
heavily protected locations in Vanni. Storing heavy mortars as per specifications
require very large areas; heavy trucks, tractors etc. must be roaming
around. There are no other machinery operators in Vanni other than the
LTTE. Therefore, it cannot be difficult to track down tiger logistics
and destroy them before the armed forces take a beating. Even if it
takes to destroy most of the jungle areas in the hunt for terrorists,
it is worth it.
Mass exodus of civilians out of Vanni has not happened yet. This is
what the LTTE fears most; in case of a civilian displacement exposing
the tigers, it will be no more than a training exercise for the army
to hunt down the terrorists while sweeping the refugee camps for infiltrators.
Therefore, the tigers will do their utmost to retain civilians in Vanni.
However, it takes only a few retaliatory air strikes to chase them away
from the battle zone to safety. This is the trump card the security
forces have against any terror attack in the south. A bare-bone LTTE
can never survive the ‘scorch earth’ warfare that awaits them
in such an eventuality.
Lankan defence authorities must take into account some of the successful
strategies employed by the Allied forces in the 62 year old Normandy
Campaign code named ‘Operation Overload’; true to its name,
a very large tonnage of bombs were dropped from the air exploiting very
well the Allied air superiority over the Germans. Therefore, instead
of wasting scant resources in dozens of millions of dollars on superior
fighters like MiG-29, which is an excess to the Sri Lankan needs, the
government should rather buy heavy explosives that can penetrate the
‘three-layered defensive infrastructure’ and that can be delivered
by the existing fleet. Further delays in exterminating the terrorists
will only complicate the matter. At least now, the defence establishment
must take fast track extermination strategies.
|
