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The Conflict Largely has a Military Solution Part-I Security, a Tangible NecessityDilrook KannangaraThe Sri Lankan conflict for the most part has a military solution and not a political solution. A political solution may find its way when the country is safe and secure where people are free from undue influence, terror and duress to make correct political choices. One attempted political solution which came in the form of the Thirteenth Amendment failed miserably to achieve its intended results due to its total neglect of public wants and needs. Also, it was forced upon the people and there was no time to discuss, brainstorm or evaluate it. It was forced-enacted in the midst of a powerful outsider on one hand and a ruthless terrorist group on the other. Many later attempts didnt even get off ground. The futility of political solutions in an atmosphere of terror was evident over and over again. Therefore even if the Sri Lankan conflict has a political solution, law and order must be established beforehand and that can only be done by the military and the police. Other legitimate law enforcement agencies can takeover thereafter. The democratic process in the North can flourish after that. Then would be the time to consider, discuss, debate and brainstorm freely without fear, a political solution.
Security has been a tangible necessity for the past three and a half decades due to violence instigated by the JVP and the LTTE. People need to be provided security right throughout the country under civil administration to save them from LTTE bombs, suicide attackers, armed LTTE terrorists, black-tiger terrorists and their connected unruly elements including the drug and underworld mafia. No political solution or agreement with the LTTE can provide this. A classic example is the CFA. The Cease Fire Agreement (not Ceasefire Agreement) resulted in increased firing at civilians than before in areas under government control and there was nothing the government could do to prevent or control it. These attacks targeted democratic Tamil political activists and members of security establishments. In other words, LTTEs target was the most vulnerable sections of the national security apparatus. Gradually these attacks increased to target the Army Commander, the most senior army General and the Defence Secretary whilst the LTTE reiterated its commitment to the CFA. Tamil Tigers complete inability to honour an agreement was clear without a hint of doubt. Sadly it was not the first time.
Additionally security is of paramount importance especially for the Sinhalese and Muslims living in the North and the East as racist Tamil Tigers are on a persistent hunt for them in order to create their Tamil only Tamil Elam. There is no way security can be compromised. The plight of tens of thousands of farming families in Mahavil Oya (Mavil Aru) in 2006 is a case in point. No political solution can assure their safety. MBRL fire was evidently more effective than the Cease Fire Agreement in saving them. This is the reality right around the country.
Each suggested political solution must be assessed on its logical ability to ensure public safety and national security both in the short term and the long term. If it cannot guarantee public safety and national security both in the short term and the long term, it has no relevance whatsoever. Sacrificing the lives of peace loving, democratic people of all races hoping that LTTEs thirst for blood will be eventually satiated is a demonic proposition. Unfortunately there are plenty of scholars each with his/her little political solution falling into this category.
How about the security of the economic infrastructure, especially in the North-East? There will be refineries, harbours, power plants, oil storages, cement factories, large agricultural settlements and many other valuable economic infrastructure in the North-East. Should these be at the mercy of a terrorist organisation? Should these pay false taxes to a bunch of terrorists just to remain operative? No; not at all; there is a military solution that can avoid such tragedies. For instance the proposed power plant in Trincomalee is built over the dead of the LTTE and the Mannar basin oil drilling project comes up on former LTTE territory that was plundered by the security forces. Also agricultural settlements in Weli Oya, Padaviya, etc. have come up as a direct result of destroying LTTE presence in the area.
From another point of view it is said that a successful state will have a monopoly of the use of violence. This is a theoretical statement meaning that there cannot be any non-state actors with the ability to sustain aggression, violence, the capacity to punish and compel people to follow rules. A state is said to fail when it doesnt have such a monopoly of violence unleashed through legitimate means. This country must pull its act together by eliminating all unruly non-state actors that use violence. This is the path to becoming a highly successful state. No political solution can do so. In fact a political solution can create multiple actors with the right to use violence! However, a military solution can achieve a successful state, provided it is planned and executed properly. Sri Lanka was at war for the most part of the past 25 years. But there has not been that ultimate military victory. This has prompted some quarters to suggest a solution other than a military solution. However, they have not studied in detail why 25 years of military campaigns didnt produce that ultimate win for Sri Lanka and defeat for the LTTE. LTTE started its terror campaign against the state in 1976 (some put this as 1972). However, it took Sri Lanka another 7 years to lock horns in war. Therefore Sri Lanka started 7 years behind the LTTE. There were few hiccups in their military campaign thereafter that further pushed them backward. In 1985 there were a few months of stoppage of military action only by Sri Lankan troops for Thimpu talks; Tigers continued regardless. Again in 1987 there was a stoppage by Sri Lankan forces not reciprocated by the LTTE. A monumental setback came in 1989-90 where a 14 month stoppage of war by Lankans not followed by the LTTE was observed. Then again in 1994-95 a similar setback was suffered only by the security forces. However, the longest lull came in 2002-2006. In all these instances LTTE strengthened its arsenal and achieved an unprecedented upper hand over their rivals. All in all Sri Lanka lost over 6 years of military operations after 1983 but tigers didnt lose a day! This puts the disparity at over 13 years. Sri Lankan forces were lagging 13 years behind the LTTE in their military campaign by 2006. However, due to proper leadership and unprecedentedly aggressive strategies, Sri Lankan forces managed to close this gap within just two and a half years. Now it is up to both adversaries to fight it until the innings of the weakest is over. Those who doubt the capabilities of security forces to finish off the LTTE were in for minor tremors lately and they are in for a big one.
Total annihilation of the LTTE will not only defeat it, but also defeat their Tamil Elam ideology. This brings up the vital question: Is there any other way for Tamil Elam other than the LTTE? The answer is No. This has been accepted by virtually all Tamil Elamists and they have stood by the LTTE amidst many adversities. Creating Tamil Elam essentially involves killing Sri Lanka and amputating its limbs. This can only be done forcibly under anaesthetics! As a self conscious democracy, Sri Lanka and its people will never allow disintegration of their society. Many non violent and less violent campaigns that tried to get Tamil Elam since 1924 couldnt even make their aspirations known beyond their circles. These elements as a last resort will force the government to come up with a hasty political solution to save the tigers when they are convinced that tigers are about to go extinct. These pitfalls must be avoided. A proper political solution that can stand the test of time - in an atmosphere where there is no LTTE - must be introduced after finishing off the tigers. Even then it must be put to the approval by the people.
Another advantage of a military solution is that it allows Sri Lanka the right to chose one uncontested diplomatic stance in its foreign affairs. Whether Lanka gets aid from Iran or the EU is not something that may be decided or influenced by the LTTE. However, LTTE decided which countries could interfere in Sri Lankan affairs during the CFA. It even sacked a few from ceasefire monitoring! There was a time when foreign delegates visiting Sri Lanka had to make a pilgrimage to Killinochchi! In 2002 LTTE protested the government decision to extend the lease of oil storage facilities in Trincomalee. Tigers close relationship with North Korea, which is nothing but unimportant to Sri Lanka, is another example. Tigers military purchases from a Chinese company went against the goodwill of both countries and ultimately LTTE purchases stopped. Strong LTTE links with Tamil Nadu fishermen is causing a lot of headaches to both countries and some are trying to use this to send a wedge between the two. Plundering a Jordanian ship, robbing Indian and Chinese vessels and fishing trawlers were other LTTE adventures. All this undesirable influencing of Lankan foreign relations had national security concerns as well. Militarily defeating the LTTE will permanently end this confusion.
Considering all the above, it is certain that a military solution to
the conflict is imperative. Further, many undesirable things brought
about by the conflict have only a military cure. |
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