|
SCOPP REVIEW
The Ceasefire Agreement Six Years Later
Annulment creates broader space to achieve sustainable peace
Secretariat for Coordinating
the Peace Process (SCOPP)
26th February 2008
The Ceasefire Agreement was signed six years ago by the then Sri Lankan
Prime Minister, without consultation of the elected Executive President
or even the Cabinet. Though he could claim a mandate for initiating
negotiations, following the victory of his party in the 2001 Parliamentary
Election, the failure to consult adequately can be seen as one reason
for a structurally flawed document that contributed substantially and
visibly to the erosion of the sovereignty of Sri Lanka. It negated the
Constitutional foundations that underlie the State of Sri Lanka. It
undermined the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka in that it granted
what seemed virtual immunity to a non -State actor, i.e. the LTTE, from
being subject to offensive operations by the armed forces when performing
their legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Sri Lanka. It also privileged one party in an apparent
demarcation of certain areas as LTTE held, thus preventing the Armed
Forces and Sinhalese civilians from entering such areas while LTTE cadres
were given free access to every part of the country. Though the Preamble
to the CFA states that the "overall objective" of the GOSL
and the LTTE "is to find a negotiated solution to the ongoing ethnic
conflict in Sri Lanka", it was never seriously pursued because
the LTTE was not interested in a negotiated settlement, and withdrew
from negotiations just over a year after the CFA was signed.
The CFA limited discussions to being between the GOSL and the LTTE,
and thus denied opportunity to include others from the Tamil community.
In retrospect the CFA became a dead letter; an instrument to negotiate
a solution with an uninterested party who wanted to exclude any others
who might be serious about a negotiated solution. In abrogating the
CFA a path is now cleared to negotiate a solution with a more representative
Tamil delegation, in consultation also with other minorities, as well
as other political interest groups.
The CFA was honoured in the breach by the LTTE, which in the considered
judgment of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (initially composed of
representatives from five Nordic countries) violated the CFA 3830 times
vis -a- vis Govt. violations that amounted to 351. The Ceasefire was
never an impediment for the LTTE to engage in acts of terrorism against
civilian and military targets. The CFA provided a veil for the LTTE
to indulge in a game of hypocrisy and to prepare for war under an effective
cover of searching for peace. It was able to strengthen its military
potential manifold during the CFA. The LTTE took advantage of the Government
adhering to the letter of the CFA and ceasing all operations whether
offensive or defensive against the LTTE :
a) to murder dozens of unarmed and defenseless Tamils who were opposed
to the LTTE and were disarmed in terms of the CFA,
b) to murder Tamil informants,
c) to attack the Police Stations at Point Pedro and Valachchenai and
the STF Base at Kanchanankudah soon after the commencement of the CFA,
d) to sink merchant vessels,
e) to detain two SLMM Monitors against their will on board a LTTE vessel
on 14 July 2002, upon detection of communication equipment, when they
got on board a trawler which appeared on the territorial waters of Palk
Bay,
f) to destroy a LTTE ship on detection by the SLMM of smuggled arms,
which resulted in two SLMM monitors ( who discovered the hidden explosives
) nearly losing their lives. They had to jump overboard to save themselves
when the LTTE set fire to the explosive laden ship on detection It was
originally intercepted by the SL Navy near the Delft Islands on February
10, 2003,
g) to attack the Chinese Trawler "Fu Yuan Ya 225" on March
20th 2003,
h) to murder the Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar on 12 August 2005,
i) to regroup, rearm and launch massive attacks on Government forces
in 2006. The LTTE itself called these attacks "Unceasing Waves
- Eelam War 4",
j) the killing of nine SLN personnel in Chettikulam on 12 January 2006,
which prompted the SLMM shortly after the election of a new government
to question the actual existence of the Ceasefire Agreement in the SLMM
Press Release issued on 13 January 2006 ( The headline of the Press
Release was ' SLMM questions whether there is still a Ceasefire")
k) to attempt to murder the Sri Lanka Army Commander General Sarath
Fonseka on 25 April 2006
l) to withdrew security guarantees given to the SLMM and the ICRC with
regard to sea monitoring and forcing the SLMM to suspend sea monitoring
on 11 May 2006, following the attack on the ship 'The Jetliner'
m) to attack a bus load of innocent civilians by detonating a claymore
mine killing 60 civilians at Kebitigollewa on the 15 June 2006,
n) to deprive thousands of civilians living down stream of the Mavil
Aru Anicut of water on 22 July 2006,
o) to attack, in the guise of civilians in a bus, the forces at the
checkpoint on the A9 leading northward into the Jaffna peninsula, and
launch thereby on August 11 2006 a ferocious attack which involved its
so-called head of the Political Wing, Mr Thamilchelvam, on the army
lines there, thus precipitating the closure of the road at that point
p) to murder the Deputy Secretary - General of the Peace Secretariat,
Ketish Loganathan on 12 August 2006,
q) to force the SLMM monitors from Denmark, Finland and Sweden to withdraw
by refusing to give them assurances of protection and effectively truncating
the Mission in September 2006,
r) to murder 98 sailors of the Navy by crashing an explosives-laden
vehicle into a naval convoy at Digampatana in the Habarana area of Matale
district on 16 October 2006,
s) to attempt to murder the Sri Lanka Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse
on 1 December 2006
t) to engage in acts of piracy and loot ships e.g. Jordanian Merchant
Vessel MV FARAH III, in December 2006,
u) to attempt to murder an elected Tamil Member of Parliament and Minister,
Douglas Devananda, on 28 November 2007,
v) to refuse from 2006 onward to provide guarantees to the ICRC to enable
them to facilitate the smooth shipping of supplies to Jaffna, or sea
transport of civilians to and from Jaffna, all of which has now to be
accompanied by naval support to ensure safety and security
w) to expand the territory over which they exercised usurped power by
occupying Manirasakulam and fortifying Sampur to smuggle about eleven
shiploads of arms into the country
x) to refrain for several months from giving the required guarantees
to enable the A9 to be opened northward into the territories under their
control, in order to claim falsely that supplies were restricted, even
though throughout this period the government of Sri Lanka was ensuring
supplies whilst continuing to fund education and health and other social
services for all its citizens including those in LTTE controlled areas
y) to continue to recruit children forcibly into their armed forces
from 2002 to 2007 inclusive
z) to prevent the holding of local government elections in the East
when initially planned by the Minister of Constitutional Affairs
aa) to force the resignation of an elected Member of Parliament from
the Eastern Province Mr Kingsley Rajanayagam, on the grounds that he
supported the breakaway Karuna faction, and subsequently to assassinate
him on October 19, 2004 at Kalliyankadu, Batticaloa
bb) to build up an airstrip, having prevented the SLMM from inspecting
this in accordance with their monitoring requirements
cc) to claim on the strength of the CFA that they should not be prosecuted
for collecting and using finances internationally for terrorist purposes
dd) to forcibly recruit one person from every family in the area under
their control in 2007, extending this even to the families of those
working with international aid agencies
Despite these grave provocations, and continuing suffering for the Tamil
people in LTTE controlled areas, the Government Forces stuck to the
ceasefire and took limited remedial measures only after the attack on
the Army Commander in April 2006. After the full scale assaults by the
LTTE on two fronts in August 2006, the Sri Lankan forces decided in
the interest of national security to ensure that such offensives could
not be repeated. It was only then that the operation to clear the East
conclusively began.
SLMM Rulings - Select Excerpts:
1) The Assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar on 12 August
2005
"SLMM strongly condemns the brutal assassination of Foreign Minister
Lakshman Kadirgamar. The barbaric act is a huge blow to the peace process
as a whole. Such brutal violence creates, fear, distrust and insecurity
within society, and therefore represents a serious threat to the ceasefire".
2) Violation of the CFA with LTTE sea movements and attacks on the Sri
Lankan Navy - 11 May 2006
"The SLMM takes these threats very seriously and would like to
remind the LTTE of its responsibility as an equal partner to the Ceasefire
Agreement to do everything in its power not to jeopardize the monitors'
safety".
3) LTTE claymore mine attack on a civilian bus near Kebitigollewa-15
June 2006
' This is not only the bloodiest attack on civilians since the Ceasefire
Agreement was signed in February 2002, but yet another set back in the
peace process in Sri Lanka".
4) Closure of the Mavil Aru anicut -22 July 2006
"The findings made by and provided to the SLMM show that the measures
taken by the LTTE to close the Mavil Aru sluice gates on 22 July 2006,
whether with or without the help of or on behalf of the people of the
Verugal area, as well as the continuation of keeping the gates closed,
have led to
" the creation of a humanitarian crisis in the area surrounding
and being dependant on the Mavil Aru dam, and thereby
" the creation of a situation conducive to direct conflict between
the two Parties.
" Putting the civilian population in severe physical danger as
the possibility of them being caught in crossfire greatly increased
with the escalating tension and violence, as well as
" Constraining the possibilities of rational discussions and negotiations
towards a solution to the conflict. "
5) Assassination of Deputy Secretary General, Kethesh Loganathan on
the 12th August 2006
"There are no words strong enough to condemn this vicious and cold
blooded murder of yet another statesman living for peace."
6) Attack on the Jordanian ship Farah III on 28 December 2006
"SLMM strongly advised the LTTE to respect International Law and
the sovereign rights of Sri Lanka in the territorial waters surrounding
the island…..with regards to the Jordanian ship FARAH III, the
LTTE acted contradictory to its commitment to the CFA".
Norwegian Minister of International Development Erik Solheim says:
LTTE's request for the removal of Monitors from the EU countries- September
2006
"The LTTE's demand that SLMM monitors from EU countries be replaced
is deeply regrettable and will weaken the SLMM in a critical period,"
says Norwegian Minister of International Development Erik Solheim (
key facilitator of the peace process)
Other verdicts of the SLMM will continue to be available through their
website, which will be linked to that of the Royal Norwegian Embassy
website in Colombo.
Comment
The annulment of an ill-conceived and unsustainable 'agreement' does
not in any way fetter the Government of Sri Lanka from seeking a long
lasting solution that addresses the genuine grievances of all sections
of the people, and in particular the Tamil community in the North and
East of this country. The Government has already begun the recruitment
of Tamil policemen, on a targeted programme never attempted by previous
Governments. Though entry was always open to security forces for all
Sri Lankan citizens, minorities were not actively recruited, and in
recent years Tamils, facing the threat of execution as traitors by the
LTTE, were slow to apply. This has changed, following the liberation
of the East from the LTTE, and recently 175 police men and women passed
out at a ceremonial parade in Batticaloa.
The Government is now secure in the knowledge that there is a broader
space available to interact with all sections of the Tamil community,
including elements of the Tamil diaspora, most of which sections were
left out of a participatory role due to the highly restrictive and limiting
scope of the Ceasefire Agreement. In annulling the CFA the Government
affirms its commitment to all its citizens in the democratic dispensation
that it is now free to promulgate.
|
