MILITARY OPTION
FIGHTING LTTE
Though it is very important for us to analyze what had gone wrong, it is time consuming and painstaking to prove these factors though not difficult. Therefore, let us discuss the history very briefly and try to find solutions to the crisis. Failure of the Sri Lankan Forces against the LTTE should be regarded seriously and analyzed positively to help our forces to resolve weaker areas effectively and swiftly. After all their failure will be our failure too. Following are some of the factors that is effecting the efficiency of the Armed Forces:
COMBAT POWER
The outcome of a battle will be dependent on the 'Combat Power' of the opposing forces. This depends on four key factors:
a. Protection. This means protecting own troops as well as the equipment & resources. Our troops are deployed for a long time without a break. Some of the officers and men have been in the battlefield for the last 12 to 15 years continuously. Their families are left in despair and unattended without any solutions to their problems in sight. Officers and soldiers are nothing but providers of measly monthly incomes. The officers and soldiers live in very improvised accommodation exposed to all the environmental hazards with no proper meals and the basic necessities. In some areas soldiers do not have sufficient water to carryout their washing and has to wait for three to four days to get to water source, provided the situation permits. Soldiers' leave is a nightmare by itself. Seven days leave after three months of duty takes at least 10 to 14 days of traveling and waiting. It is ironic that people in the south do not understand the plight our soldiers go through. This type of environment lowers the morale of the troops, which in turn disrupt the teamwork and unity, as officers and soldiers naturally tends to be more selfish to look after them than the nation.
Government leaders and the senior commanders should learn to provide more attention to the well being of troops, not to exhaust them unnecessarily, keep their spirits united and conserve their energy if they want to defeat a guerilla outfit like LTTE. If they and their families were not protected and well looked after, then they would see no reason to protect the state, government and the people with their lives.
The current tactical concept is the deployment of troops, way back in mid 1980s, to deceive LTTE and release troops for offensive operations. It consists of one line of defense with little or no reserves. Troops are holding as much as 100 meters per two soldiers. All what LTTE needs to do is to concentrate their forces at on particular point and break through the defences. It should be mentioned that it is in deed creditable for our troops to hold the LTTE, despite such poor tactical concepts.
This type of deployment is the worst in the history of warfare and offers no protection to the troops at all. It is like cracking of an egg. In the centre of this thin shell remain the vital elements such as command centres, heavy weapons such as all important artillery guns and armourd vehicles, reserves of ammunitions and supplies. This tactical concept has caused havoc with the Army, but being used as the only defensive concept. As the famous war strategists Sun Tzu said to the Commanders entrusted with troops, "There are some roads which we must not follow; some enemy troops we must not fight; some cities we must not attack; some grounds we must not contest; even some orders from the ruler which we must not obey."
A military commander should be such a professional, in which he and he alone is responsible and should decide how to protect his soldiers, resources and more than anything his Country. Under these circumstances he alone should stands the glory of the victory as well as the agony and the responsibility of the defeat. We should understand this and allow the commanders in the field to decide the objectives and when to take them and contend themselves in providing the necessary resources needed for the operations.
b. Maneuver capability The LTTE concept of operation has been to wait for opportunities and to attack when the Army has moved the much-needed reserves into offensive operations. LTTE move their forces very quickly and concentrates the forces on the required area to obtain the local superiority. On the other hand Army do not have enough troops to timely maneuver & stop the LTTE assault, as they are over stretched and protecting more areas than they can effectively protect.
Low morale and the inability to maneuver the forces to counter the LTTE assault combined with poor command and controls by officers were the major reasons for the fall of Mankulam and the adjacent areas. When troops are inclined to flee, insubordinate against commands, distressed, disorganized and defeated, it is the fault of the general as non-of these calamities arises from natural causes. It is the time for the Army to rethink of their defensive tactical concept, as this age all improvisation flouts all principles of warfare.
Army's adhoc organizations are another reason for the failures. Army high command has the tendency to break and make fighting divisions and brigades to suit the requirements and thereby has destroyed the essential teamwork. This in turn has destroyed the much needed unity and co-ordination that is required to manuvre & destroy a determined and organized enemy like LTTE.
c. Fire Power. Sri Lankan Army is superior in firepower, than the LTTE. To off set this LTTE carries out night attacks to close in and break through. Their "blitzkrieg" like tactics to punch a hole in the defenses and to reach the vital elements quickly (Tactical concept used by the Germans in the world war 2) has left the Army answerless due to their bad tactical deployments and poor morale. Army had being unable to concentrate their forces even in counter attacks due to a major military doctrinal error that is being practiced to please the politicians.
All the armies in the world deploy their troops in well-established units such as Divisions, Brigades and Battalions. As a military doctrine troops are deployed as brigades and divisions. Firepower of a soldier and a unit depends on the cohesiveness and the teamwork. Good individual soldiers are a must in battle, but without teamwork they amount to nothing against a well-composed enemy. Even the individual standard of the Sri Lankan soldier is something to be desired due to shortened and poor training as the establishment is falling over each other to maintain political agendas and timetables. This concept of cohesive unit deployment is even practiced by the LTTE. But Sri Lnakan Army is the exception to the rule.
Sri Lankan Army believes in deploying soldiers in numbers, irrespective of their units. Worst, the senior command believes that a man with a gun as a soldier irrespective of whether they are from regular army, volunteer, navy, air force, police or home guards. These men with arms are put together and brought under command of an adhoc officer (without proper training) and given the responsibility to hold an area. End result is debacles like fall of Mankulam.
Army must go back to the concept training individuals well, build cohesive teams, cultivate a uniform level of courage, deploy them in their teams, so as to bring the best of both strong and weak soldiers alike, thus a wise general would be able to lead his entire division as if he is leading one person.
Worst is depleting the police force from the south to boost the numbers in the defense lines has left the peaceful areas vulnerable to the thugs and other criminals to carry out their activities uninterrupted. Policemen returning from active duty have the same defensive attitudes and all the police stations in the country have become little fortresses. Their aim is to protect themselves and not the citizens. In fact citizens are their enemy and what ever that happens out of the police station is not their concern. Gone are the days when we could call the police station in case of an emergency, it is better if we could look after ourselves.
d. Leadership "Do not sacrifice your men unless you can win. No commander should put his troops into battle because he is angry; no general should fight because he is resentful. An angry man can later become happy, a resentful man could become pleased, but a State once destroyed can never be restored nor the dead be brought back to life." - SUN TZU
At this moment we should consider that the failure at the lower levels of leadership is due to the failure of leadership at higher levels. If the commanders at higher level do not accept this then nothing can bring about a change and the LTTE will succeed in achieving their aims and objectives.
Leadership at senior levels should stop and consider the factors of failure. Plan a strategy of containment, buy time to train & reorganise, plan a proper strategy to fight LTTE, and to continue the fight. Army has certainly lost sight of the strategies such as separating the guerillas from the population and destroying LTTE as a fighting force. Due to political pressure the Army went on a campaign of capturing land in the name of capturing a MSR. Instead they should have concentrated in destroying LTTE, and concentrated their efforts on population centres such as Killinochchi, Pudikudiuruppu and Mullaitivu. Even concentrated their efforts on the eastern coast to prevent strategic supplies to LTTE. Armed Forces should learn that their greatest asset is the soldier and do everything to protect him. Increased wages, better facilities for the families and restoration of the image of the soldier would bring back the pride. His pride in turn will be used to protect the citizens and he leaders. It should be remembered that over ambitious plans could end up loosing what is at hand. Political Leaders and the Commanders at all times should believe in having one foot on the ground.
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